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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
De c ember 7, 1979 Conference
List ] , Sheet 4
No. 79-639
UNITED STATES

v.
SIOUX NATIONS
SUM!'i~RY:

Cert. to U. S. Ct of CJ.aims
(Friedman, Cowen, Davis; Nichols,
concurs; Ben~P.t~, Kunzig, dissent)
Federal/Civil

Timely

The SG puts the question t.his way: Whether

legislation which divests an Indian tribe of a portion of its
Jand in consideration of an undertaking to provide material
assistance and food rations as long as needed amounts to a
" taking" under the Fifth Amendment so as to entitle the tribe
to interest on a later award for the value of the lands.
(

-

2 -

FACTS:
- - In 1868 the United States and the Sioux Indians
signed a treaty establishing "for the absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation of the Indians" certain land in South
Dakota, incJuding 7 million acres in the Black Hills.

That

treaty provided that no cession of the reservations lands
"shall be of an validity or force" unless executed and signed
by at least three-fourths of the adult ma].e Indians occupying
the lands.
In 1874, an expedition led by then Lt. Col Custer
~

discovered gold in the Black Hills.

Thereafter, a large number

of prospectors and settlers entered the reservation area
without the consent of the Sioux.

After a period of

hostilities, including Custer's loss at Little Big Horn,
President Grant appointed a commjssion to negotiate with the

(

Sioux for the cession of the Black HilJ.s land.

In 1876 the

Commission negotiated an agreement with the Sioux chiefs
-----------~--------------pursuant to which the Sioux ceded the Black Hills portion of
the reservation and the United States, in return, agreed to
~

provide the Sioux with specified rations ''until the Indians are
able to support themselves."
Sioux approved that agreement.

Less than 10% of the adult male
In 1877, Congress resolved the

impasse by enacting into law the unratified agreement. 19 Stat.
254.

\
"-

The United States reports that it has spent approxjmately

l rnc§
$43

)

million on rations for the Sioux under the 1877 Act.
the Sioux brought suit contending that the removal

of the Black Hills from the Sioux Reservation constituted a
Fifth Amendment "taking."

The Court of CJaims rejected that

- 3 -

content.ion holding that under the doctrine of
!!itchcoc~,

~on~~<2_:!_f_~

u.s. 553 (1903), no taking had occurred. Sioux

187

.'!:.fl.be Y-..:.....JLn j t e ~-_§_tate s , 9 7 Ct . CJ.. 61 3

(J

9 4 2 ) c e r t . den i e d 3 J 8

u.s. 789 (1943).
In 1946, following the enactment of the Indian Clajms
Commission Act of 1956, a second . round of litigation commenced.
(That Act distinguishes between claims grounded on a taking of
Indian reservation land, for which a Tribe can recover
compensation with interest, and claims grounded on transactions
marked by fraud, duress, mistake or "unconscionable
consideration," for wh.ich compensation without interest will be
paid~

u.s.c.

See 25

-

§

70(a).

In 1974, the Indians Claims

-

ll

"

Commission determined that the 1877 Act did amount to a taking

-

__

----

and awarded .........,.the Sioux $17 million with interest at 5% per annum
since· 1877. 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 15J. (The interest now totals
about $105 million.)
in part.

On appeal, the Court of Claims reversed

It found that the taking claim was barred by

principles of

re .§._i~di_Qat~~

but it concluded that inadequate

consideration had been paid for the BJ.ack Hills land and that
the Sioux were therefore entitled to recover the principal
amount of the award, but without interest. United States v.
S:iou~,

518 F. 2d 1298 (Ct. Cl.) cert. denied 423

u.s. 1016

(1975).
The litigation would have ended there, except that in 1978
Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act to direct the
Court of Claims to reach the merits of the 1974 Commission
decision without regard to the

\

~es_iudicata

defense.

The Court

-

'i

-

of Claims did as directed and held that the 1877 Act had

(

effected a taking.

The SG asks this Court to review that

decision.
HOLQING _~ELQ~:

Chief Judge Friedman's pJuraJ:ity opin5.on

opined that the test for determining whether the 1877 Act
effected a taking was whether Congress had made "a good faith
effort to give the Indians the full value of the land."

!b.r~~

Affi.liated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United
Sta1~~,

390 F. 2d 686, 691 (1968).

In adopting this test, he

rejected the Government's rel.iance on

~Qne

WQ1_f,

~UE~~'

where

this Court wrote that whenever the operative statute "purports
to give an adequate consideration" for the lands appropriated,
"the courts must presume that Congress acted in perfect good
faith *** exercising its best judgment" in effecting "a mere

(

change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property."
187 U.S. at 568.

Judge Friedman noted that Lone Wolf was an

action for injunctive relief and not for damages, and read the
case as holding merely that the judiciary should not enjoin the
Congress from appropriating Indian land.

post-~one ~<.2.lf

He cited United

case whi.ch teaches that the amount given in

consideration can be considered in determining whether just
compensation has been paid.

Judge Friedman then reviewed the

legislative history and applied his "good faith" test"
The terms upon which Congress acquired the Black HiJJs
were not the product of any meaningful arms-length
bargaining, and did not reflect or show any considered

\

- 5 -

judgment by Congress that it was paying a fair price. In
the "negot5ations" the United States gave the Indians the
Hobson's choice of ceding the Black Hills or starving. Not
surprisingly, the Sioux Chiefs chose the former rather than
the latter.

***

There is no indication that Congress believed that or
even considered whether the obligation it assumed to
furnish the Sioux with rations until they could support
themswelves constituted the fair equivalent of the value of
the lands the United States was acquiring from them.

***

There is no reason to believe that Congress antic5pated
(1) that it would be required to continue to supply rations
for mor e than a half-century or (2) that its fulfilJ .rnent of
the obligation to feed the Sioux would entail the large
expenditures it ultimately made.
He concJuded that Congress had not acted in good faith and that
the 1877 Act therefore was a taking.
Judge Nichols concurred, but disagreed with the majority on
the reading of

Lo!!~Jiolf.

For him that case was "a precedent

fully applicabJe in a suit for just compensation as in

('-../

injunction suit."

Ho,.;ever, he read

Lo~~o.:!J.

as establishing a

"good faith" test identical to that adopted in FoE__!:._Ber!:_hold.
Judge Bennett, joined by Judge Nichols, dissented on the
ground that Lone Wolf gives Congress the power to dispose of
tribal. property without regard to good faith or the amount of
compensation: "once Congress has

disposed of [Indian]

property, and has given value to the Indians for it, that is
the end of the matter" under the Fifth Amendment.
CON!~~!IONS:

The SG, challenging on1y the award of
..............

-

interest, puts forward four reasons for granting certiorari:
1. The Court below has giving the precedent of

\

~on~~olf

an

-

6 -

artifica11y narrow reading. *
2. Even if Lone WoJf is inapplicable, the decision below is
wrong.

The SG characterizes the decision as "attributing bad·

faith to Congress simply because it failed to expressly say
that it was giving fair value for the lands appropriated
albeit it never suggested that it was not so doing, and, as it
turned out, was in fact overgenerous."

He asserts that this

Court has concluded that there has been a Fifth Amendment
taking of Indian lands only in instances in which no payment or

NatiQ~,

299

u.s.

295
476

u.s.

103 (1935)

(1937)

~

~

Klamath

.§_hos~Q!:!e T!__i~~~_:.._Qn5!:~2._.§_tates,

&

Moadoc Tribes, supra.

3. The decision below undermines the Indian CJ.aims
Commission Act which, according to the SG, "presumably
contemplated" that most claims would fall into the category of
cases involving inadequate consideration as to which value but

*Lone-Wolf v1as an action to enjoin the Secretaryofinted.o r from alloting and selling tribal land under a J900 statute on
the ground that the J.aw was unconstitutional. The Indians
there contended that Congress was without right to divest them
of title to reservation land without complying with a treaty
provision which required approval of three-quarters of the male
tribe members for any changes. This Court held that Congress
had power to break the treaty unilaterally. · As Judge Friedman
noted the United States was not a party in Lone Wolf and had
not consented to suit~ no court in 1903 ha~ jurisdiction to
hear and determine Indian tribal claims, including taking
claims. He therefore concJuded that Lone Wolf turned upon
Congressional power to act, and not upon what ultimately might
flow from the disputed action in the way of monetary relief.
The SG contends that since the Indians had no remedy at law the
Lone Wolf court had to hold that the challenged statute worked
no-tai<Tng, otherwise under settled equitable principles an
injunction would have issued.

- 7 -

not interest would be paid.

It denies prior claimants equal

treatment because to date successful claims based on inadequate
consideration have been awarded without interest.
4. The sum involved is substantial, and the mode of
analysis employed by the court below will affect "at least a
dozen cases sti11 pending in the ·court of Claims."
RESPONDEJ;i1:~-~.HI~F:

The respondents champion Judge

Friedman's narrow reading of Lone Wolf.

They would go further

than the Court of Claims and hold that Indians, l.ike all other
persons, are entitled to just compensation whenever property is
taken for any amount less than market value.

However, they are

satisfied with the "good faith test" in this case and argue
that if it is the proper test, the question is fact-bound and
does not merit review here.

(

Respondents a1so contend t9at the

SG's claim that the decision below will impact upon pending
cases is without

foundation~

they assert that there are no such

pending cases or at least none that they are aware of.
Finally, respondents contend that application of the Lone WC?.lf
test would deny them equal protection of the law.
DISCUSSION: The SG seems correct in his assertion that the
decisions of this Court finding a taking involve instances in
which no payment was made or inadequate payment after the fact
was made.

This Court simply has not had occasion to determine

~ whether a~qui si tion

of Indian J and for

\ compensat1on constitutes a taking.

pr~ent

but inadequate

Nor has the Court had

occasion to chose between the competing readings of the Lone

(
I

'

Wolf aecisjon.

-

- 8 -

__

Thus, the case seems certworthy.
,.._

If the Court,

----~---,

however, is prepared to adopt a standard simil_ar to that
employed by the majority below, the prospect of wading through
a volumjnous record to determine good fajth might counsel a
denial.
There is a response.
11/27/79
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l ~iG t ~~~ ibe of

a

po~o~7j\~~.;~~e.tur~~k~ro~~
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~ ,
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l4.t..-~ LAunder the Fifth

erl9,ent~~

as to

ent ~he tri ~

~ r(A..(__ -~-...~~ .

ard for the value of t ~ ~~ '

later

L-t.:-

to interest on a

7k-t_YrJ?.b-~

~~4?~ ~6- ~~

~Uu._~~~ ~~a~,.,

~ ~ ~

Ba!kground

~
The actual

7t!JtJ1 oDtJ

background of this case

convoluted to run through
are:

~~

treaty.

in this memo.

is simply too long and

The

salient

points

to me

·~,eia~ ~ ~ ~ ~

"-

1)

~~
4
4~.•.£.,_ "1 ~~

~~4#~--c_.,Qt!~~

In 1868 the United States and t~ e Sioux Nation signed a

1./L ~'
Under the treaty, the Sioux received complete control over a

large territory, including the more than 7 million acres of the Black
~

Hills at

issue in this case.

The 1868 agreement also required the

2.
Government

to

provide

rations

for

the

Indians

for

-----------~

-

four

years.

Finally, no additional cession of Sioux lands was to be accomplished
unless executed and signed by three-fourths of the adult male Indians
in the tribe.
2)

After

gold

pressures to occupy the

was

discovered

in

the

land with whites became

Black

Hills,

irresistable.

the
The

Government carne to a thoroughly rational decision to acquirethe land
from the Sioux.

Since no one could keep the prospectors out of the

vast expanse of the Black Hills, that decision made sense both for
Washington and for the Sioux.
of the

The Government commissioned a survey

land to determine its worth,

and the official statements of

this period -- about 1875 -- are full of intent to provide full value

---

for the lands.
3)

The Allison Commission

the purchase of the lands.
Indians

asked

for

in 1875 attempted to negotiate

The Commission offered $6 million.

$70 million.

The negotiations collapsed. ,

here on, my narrative may seem a bit partisan, but

I

The
(From

it reflects my

understanding and interpretation of the facts.)
4)

Washington seems to have changed its policies to attempt

to coerce the Sioux into reaching a settlement.

It directed the Army

to stop trying to keep white prospectors out of the Black Hills, and
Congress in 1876 directed that all subsistence rations to the Sioux
be -----------~------------'----------------------------------cut off within a year.
Those rations kept the tribe alive, or at
least kept alive the 30,000 who lived peacefully on the reservations
(another 3,000 or so, including Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, lived

---

off the reservation and fed themselves).

,..

These subsistence rations

were not mandated by 1868 treaty, since that only covered four years.

3.

Yet

it should be remembered that the Sioux were Plains Indians who

lived off the buffalo herds.
restriction

of

the

Sioux

The disappearance of the herds and the
to

their

reservations

eliminated

their

traditional means of self-support.
5)

War broke out in 1876, and Custer made his last stand.

All Sioux who wanted to live on the reservations were disarmed and
their horses were

taken

away.

This entirely deprived

them of any

ability to support themselves.
6)
chiefs

In the fall of 1876, a treaty was negotiated with the

of

the

Government:

(a)

tribe.

In

return

for

the

7

million

acres,

agreed to provide the Sioux with "all necessary aid

to assist the said Indians in the work of civilization";
to

furnish

the

them -with

schools;

and

(c)

agreed

to

(b)

supply

agreed

specified

rations to all working adult Sioux and children in schools "until the
Indians

are

pointed out,

able
the

to

support

first

two

themselves."
items had

As

the

Court

of

already been granted

Claims
to

the

Sioux under the 1868 treaty.
7)
treaty.
1 ~7

Less than 10 per cent of the adult male Sioux signed the

Nevertheless,

Congress enacted

its provisions

into law in

·..,
8)

Through

labrynthine

wrangling

in

Congress

and

the

courts, this case after 45 years has now been reduced to a dispute
over interest.
Both sides agree that the Government owed the Sioux
\.....
___...
$17 million for the Black Hills.
Although the Government claims to

-

have

spent

$43

million

for

support

of

the

Sioux

over

the

years,

Congress has directed that those funds should not be set off against
-

any award due to the Sioux.

The question in this case is whether the

4.

Government

"took"

the Black Hills within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment,

and thus must be held to provide just compensation.

there was such a taking,

If

the Government also owes the Indians over

$100 million in interest (at current interest rates, that's not too
bad! ) •

Discussion:

The legal questions in this case are peculiar to Indian law.
~irss ,

187

there is the problem of the impact of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,

U.S.

553

jurisdiction
fair

deal

(1903),
to

where

review

with

a

this

Court

suggested

that

lacked

congressional determination of what

Indians.

The

Lone

Wolf

holding

was

determinations are in the nature of political questions.
r~ ud ~te~

it

that

is

a

such

It has been

by this Court in Delaware Tribal Business Comm'n v. Weeks,

430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977), and should not be applied to this case.
Second,

there

is

the question of what Jlstandard of

review

should be applied to the bargain struck by Congress with the Sioux.
In Three

Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v.

States, 390 F.2d 686

<~~good
/

(Ct.

Cl.

United

1 968) , the Court of Claims adopted a

-----------------

faith effort" standard.
Under this criterion, so long as
~
Congress made a good faith effort to strike a fair deal with the

-

Indians, the courts should not review the equity of the transaction.

It

-

of

Indian

-

This standard has never been reviewed by this Court.

-----...-..dubious test.

------~....

highly

-

I think it a

retains much of Lone Wolf's deference to

~

congressional

conduct

little concern for

affairs,

the rights of Indians.

while

also

demonstrating

In no other context may

5.
Congress unilaterally set the price for condemned land.
circumstances, the courts value the property.

u.s.

Co. v. United States, 148

In all other

Monongahela Navigation

312 (1893).

I see no compelling reason to adopt a different posture
this

case,

especially

in light of the

the Indians and the Government.
as

a

departure

Tribe

v.

from

United

this

States,

Indeed,

Court's

u.s.

299

unusual

relationship between

I would

view ~rt

traditional

position

476

and

(1937),

in

Marshall's opinion in ~rokee Nation v. Georgia,

Berthold

/'

in Shoshone

in Chief Justice

u.s.

30

(1831).

In both of those decisions, this Court ruled that the Government must
pay

just

compensation

under

the

Fifth

Amendment

for

any

property

"

~----------------,~-----------------------------------taken from Indian
tribes.
The SG suggests that because Congress is
trustee for the Indians this Court should utilize a lesser standard
of

review

for

interests of

congressional

the

Indians.

actions

But here

protect interests other than the

that

must

be

taken

in

the

the Congress clearly sought to

Indians'.

In most cases,

must guard both the public interest and the Indians'
conflict of loyalties suggests that the need for

Congress

interest.

This

judicial review of

compensation is even sharper in takings of Indian land.
Thus,

I

would

apply

the

Fifth

Amendment

taking

clause

~----------------------------------directly to this transaction.
This result would require the payment
this

superficially

case.

incorrect

It would be possible to reach

the

because the SG continues to chant that

same

the

l

6.

Government

spent

$43

million

supporting

the

Sioux,

even

though

respondent argues persuasively (to me) that the eventual cost of the
subsistence payments should not be taken as dispositive of the equity
of

the

original

deal.

Moreover,

I

think

the

"good

faith

approach is simply not justified under the Fifth Amendment.

effort"
Because

the treaty was never accepted by the Sioux, the Government took the
land
land.

by

statute.

The

Government

should pay a

fair

price

for

the

d

DS

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

March 21, 1980

RE:

No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation

The sG•s reply brief opposes any abandonment of this Court•s
previously deferential
Indian

tribes.

The

approach

to

SG suggests

congressional

arrangements
c:.-----'--------·
----------

briefly

that

such

a

course

with
would

convert "every valid exercise" of Congress• "plenary power to manage
tribal lands for the benefit of the tribe" into a "taking" under the
Although the SG does not really press the point,

Fifth Amendment.

the claim does focus on what I see as the major danger in the course
I

recommended

in

the

main

substantial

liability will

cases.

way

One

decision
After

to

limit

in this case

all,

the

SG 1 s

bench

That

memo:

be

imposed on

the

that

prospect

would

t~ts
argument

-- a e

concerns

the

unforeseen

Government
be

to

in

and

future

restrict

tutoi i : t :_king of
management

of

the

~
Indian

assets, an issue that arises more frequently than simply the seizure
of

land.

In addition,

I

suspect that

future 1 iabil i ty were real,
about it.

if the prospect of crushing

the SG would be screaming a bit louder

The muted tones of his reply brief suggests to me that the

2.

course I

initially recommended is not likely to involve unacceptable

costs to the Government.

79-639 U.S. v. SIOUX NATION

Argued 3/24/80
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SUPP~EMENTA~ - MEM0RANBUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

March 25, 1980

RE:

No. 79-639, Bnited - States - v; - Sioox - Nation

The $17 million base figure for the Black Hills was set by
the Indian Claims Commission in 1974.

Sioox - Nation - v; - United · States,

33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 362-363 (1974).
that award.

The Court of Claims affirmed

Bnited - States - v; - Sioox - Nation,

1975), cert. denied, 423

u.s.

1016.

518 F.2d 1298

(Ct. Cl.

Thus, the valuation of the land

is no longer a live issue in this litigation.
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 7, 1980
.,
3.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States
79-639

..'.
-)

Because my mention of the possibility that some
of our earlier cases would strongly indicate that the
congressional directive to re-hear this case in the
Court of Claims without regard to the defense of res
judicata could run afoul of the limitations placed on
Article III courts , I have done some further looking
into the matter .
I must confess that one of the closest
cases in point I found was one which Harry suggested to
me , United States v. Klein, 13 Wall . 128 (1872). As
with so many other areas of the law, there are cases going
both ways, but I am tentatively convinced that the Klein
rationale is persuasive. Since this would represent a
dissenting view, requiring vacation of the decision of
the Court of Claims, and since the Chief has already assigned
the case for preparation of a majority opinion affirming
the Court of Claims, in the interest of orderly procedure
I shall simply circulate a dissent along the above mentioned
lines after the draft majority opinion circulates.

....

...
'

' .t"
<.

Sincerely,/

1-

..
,.

•·

Jj.

April 10,

t

\

.r....

79-639

u. s.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
.j

'
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.,,ll•

,.;.

'
"""h··If"'''

·.

Bill Rehnquist's memorandum of April 7 prompts me
to say that although my vote at Conference - and now - is to
affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims, I have never
considered carefully the suggestion that Congress exceeded
its lawful authority in directing the Court of Claims to
disregard the defense of res judicata.

I'

'

v. Sioux Nation

'

'

~~

must say, however, that in light of the case
Harry brought to our attention (United States v. Klein, 13
Wall. 128), the point is not frivolous. I therefore have
some uneasiness about our decision. Quite apart from the
large sum of money involved in this particular case, I have
wondered whether our decision will establish a precedent that
will give rise to similar claims from Indian tribes that over the past century or more - may have been persuaded or
coerced to surrender lands under circumstances that now would
be viewed as a "taking".
I

In sum, if Rill Rehnquist's further study indicates
that there is indeed a substantial constitutional auestion as
to congressional power, I could vote for a reargument on this
issue. I appreciate that the possibility of reargument was
suagested at Conference, and there appeared to be
insufficient interest in reargument to delay the assignment
of the writing of an oPinion on the merits. I write now
merely to express the above qualification to my otherwise
positive vote to affirm.
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CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 11, 1980
Re:

No. 79-639

United States v. Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:
Since a number of us seem to be bombarding one another
with memoranda in this case, I take the liberty of
responding to your memorandum of April 11, to make just a
few preliminary points in response. United States v.
Klein is unquestionably distinguishable from the
congressional action taken in this case on several
grounds, two of which you mention in your memorandum.
Nevertheless, one of the underlying principles of the
Klein decision was that finality is an essential component
of Art. III decisions and that Congress may not interfere
with the exercise of judicial power by stripping a
judgment of its finality. I believe that this premise of
Klein has survived and may have applicability to this case.
This Court in Pope v. United States, 323 u.s. 1
(1944), another case which you cite, found that the
decision in Klein "rested upon the ground that • • •
Congress was without constitutional authority to control
the exercise of • • • judicial power • • • by requiring
this Court to set aside the judgment of the Court of
Claims." Id. at 8. The Court in Pope found that the
congressional act in issue there did not conflict with
Klein because properly construed, it did not "set aside [a
prior] judgment or • • • require a new trial of the issues
• which the court had resolved against petitioner."
The Court specifically found that because Congress had not ·
set aside a final judgment of an Art. III court, the Act
did not "encroach upon the judicial function which the
Court of Claims had previously exercised." The Court was
careful to reserve the question of whe~her there would be
unconstitutional encroachment upon that function if
Congress had set aside the prior judgment of the Court of

- 2 Claims and ordered a new trial (as opposed to forming a
new statutory obligation). The Court stated:
"We do not consider jus t what application
the principles announced in the Klein case
could rightly be given to a case in which
Congress sought, pendente lite, to set aside
a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor
of the government and to require
relitigation of this suit. For we do not
construe the [Act] as r e quiring the Court of
Claims to set aside the judgment in the case
already decide d or as changing the rules of
decision for the determination of a pending
case."
(Emphasis ad d ed.)
·
Thus Pope reserves the very question which you state
was decided by Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S.
476 almost twenty years earlier. While I was aware of the
Cherokee Nation case, I am not satisfied that it should be
found controlling in this situation.
In Cherokee, the
Court found that Congress passed a statute permitting
relitigation so that the Cherokees could present a theory
that they were entitled to interest on a compounded basis,
rather than merely the simple interest which they were
awarded in a prior Court of Claims decision. The Court in
the Cherokee case states that the theory of computing
interest which the Cherokees were asserting in the second
action was not "presented either to the Court of Claims or
to this Court.
It is a new argument not before
considered." 270 U.S. at 486. Thus Cherokee did not
present the precise issue of whether Congress can require
an Art. III Court to adjudicate the identical issue more
than one time.
I am not convinced that Congress has done no more than
assert a litigant's waiver in this case. Congress in fact
has required the Court of Claims to adjudicate an issue
which it has already adjudicated. While other litigants

- 3 may also be able to waive res judicata, I do not think
that a court would feel obligated to exercise its
jurisdiction under such circumstances. Thus I think the
congressional action in this case is more appropriately
characterized as a congressional grant of a new trial on
an issue which has been finally decided. I am not ready
to conclude that simply on the authority of Cherokee
Nation there is no invasion of judicial powers when
Congress declines to respect the firyality of this Court's
decisions, sets aside a valid judgment, and orders a new
trial on an issue previously decided in an Article III
Court. If we were to enter a judgment in favor of the
United States in this case, could Congress order the Court
of Claims to hear the issue once again? Under your
reading of Cherokee Nation, I think the answer to that
question would have to be yes.
I had not intended to articulate my position in this
case as of yet, since it is still in the formative stages,
but I did want to express my view that the question should
be viewed as quite substantial despite the decision in
Cherokee Nation. If the Court in Klein was right that
Congress does not have the power to set aside a final
judgment of an Art. III Court, then I think this case may
well be governed by Klein. I think the Court in PoEe
wisely reserved the question presented in this case and I
think we should give it the consideration it deserves.
Sincerely,

~~~
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBI!:RS OP'

April 11, 1980

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

Bill Rehnquist's memorandum of April 7, and Lewis'
randum of April 10, prompt me to set forth my present
on the question whether Congress had the constitutional
to enact legislation requiring the Court of Claims to
the merits of the Sioux' taking claim.

memoviews
power
reach

As I indicated at Conference, I believe that United States
· v. Klein, a case I brought up, is properly distinguishable
from this case, principally on two. grounds.
First, the case
traditionally has been read as a limitation on Congress'
power to dictate how evidence in a particular case is to be
judged, when that power also interferes with the consti tutional authority committed to a co-equal branch -- in Klein,
Congress attempted to render the President's pardon power a
nullity.
No such problem is presented in this case.
See
Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
315-316 (2d ed. 1973).
Second, in Klein, the legislation
which Congress enacted had the effect of retroactively closing the doors of the Court of Claims to a party who already
had been adjudged to have a legitimate claim against the
United States. Here, of course, Congress' legislative action
had the effect of giving a claimant against the Government a
second chance to establish its claim.
Arguably, legislative
action by which Congress waives its right to a judgment in
its favor does not present the same kind of equitable concerns that were presented in Klein.
Moreover, since Conference I have had the occasion to
look into this issue a bit more closely. For the present, I
am convinced that the later case of Cherokee Nation v. United
States, 270 u.S. 4 76 ( 1926) , is controlling on the question.
The facts of that case reveal that the Cherokee had obtained
a judgment against the u.s., affirmed by this Court in Ap~il,
1906, which judgment included a large amount of interest.
Thereafter, in 1919, Congress passed a special act that gave

Page 2.
jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear and determine the
claim of the Cherokee against the u.s. for additional
interest arising out of the same substantive claim.
This
Court .observed that "but for the special act of 1919 •
the question here mooted would have been foreclosed as res
judicata."
Id., at 486.
"The Court construed the special
act as a waiver · of the res judicata effect of the prior
j~dgment, and concluded: "The power of Congress to waive such
an adjudication is clear."
Ibid.
See also Pope v. United
States, 323 U.S. 1, 8-10 (discussing, inter alia, Klein and
Cherokee Nation).
---I, of course, shall be interested in what Bill Rehnquist
may come up with.
For now, however, I am fairly persuaded
that there is no need for reargument since our prior cases
establish the authority of Congress to waive the res judicata
effects of a prior judgment in the Government's favor.
In response to Lewis' concern that this case may establish a precedent that will enable Indian tribes to raise
similar claims based on "takings" of . a century ago, I have
only a brief observation.
Does not the five year statute of
limitations for claims existing before August 13, 1946,
established in 25 U.S.C. § 70k, obviate that concern to a
significant extent?
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CHAMBERS OF"

T HE CH I EF .JUSTICE

Re :

Ap r il 11 , 19 80

79-639 - United States v . Sioux Na ti on

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
Tentatively, I lean to Harry's reading of
Klein.
It is one thing f or Congress to try to nullify
a favorable judgment and not quite the same to "revive"
a "dead" claim.
It can always do the latter by private
bills but historically it has used the Court of Claims
as its "agent" to analyze the evidence relating to
damages and even broader questions which a committee
of Congress is not equipped to deal with.
For the moment, I am content to wait for the
opinion and perhaps that will resolve doubt~
Regards,

~u:prtmt

Q}ltUrlcf flrt ~tb ~taftg,
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C HAMBE RS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 14, 1980
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

I fully agree with Harry's most recent memorandum
in this case dated April 14th, and especially with his
observation that the case should not be set for reargument.
After all, the Solicitor General is obligated to defend an
Act of Congress, and setting it for reargument would
place the government in the very awkward position of
asserting the Act's unconstitutionality, or of giving
us no adversary presentation.
Sincerely,

~
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CHAMBERS Of"

April

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

The recent correspondence prompts me to circulate this
memorandum.
The case has been assigned to me for an
op1n1on.
I have no desire to undertake that substantial
task (I trust you all will agree it is rather substantial
if the merits are to be reached) , if there is a fair
likelihood that a majority ultimately will conclude that
Congress exceeded its authority.
I think it desirable, therefore, that we focus on that
issue and count the votes. If a majority feel the way Bill
Rehnquist does, the case should be reassigned.
If a
majority feel otherwise, at least tentatively, I shall be
willing to go ahead.
As of now, I would reach the merits.
The recent correspondence indicates that the Chief feels that way; that
Bill Rehnquist is of the other view; and that Lewis is
perhaps inclined in the other direction.
I shall do
nothing until the dust settles.
I might add as a postscript, that I am not very enthusiastic about setting the case for reargument. Although I
think it unnecessary, I would not be opposed to requesting
prompt briefing on this added issue if a majority is so
inclined.
There then would be a chance of getting the
case down before the Summer.

Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:
This is a reply to vour memorandum of April
I supnose that rearqument woulrl, as Bill Rehnquist
noted, place the qovernment is an awkward position. But I do
not think Rill's point is frivolous, and certainly you are
entirely riqht that we should make a decision on the
rebriefinq or reargument without further delay. I would join
four for a request for briefing on this sinqle issue. Absent
such a vote, vou can count on mv remaininq with my Conference
vote.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
,

cc:

The Conference

'
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 21, 1980
·:

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

II·

I.

,

I

I think I appreciate the points both Harry and
Lewis have made in their recent correspondence on this
subject. Given the convoluted nature of the proceedings,
I think the awkwardness of the position of the government to which Lewis refers in his letter to Harry of
April 18th is apparent~ I would, with Lewis, join for
re-argument with the stipulation that an amicus be appointed
to brief and argue the Article III issue.

J

! '•
·.
1

·-

1'

I

I
II

Sincerely,~

,.
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CHAMBERS 0,.

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 21, 1980

Re:

No. 79-639, United States v.
Sioux Nation

Dear Harry,
I am more than a little concerned about
the impact of a decision that there was a
"taking .. in this case, but I remain of the
view that there was. Although the issue that
interests Bill Rehnquist is not a ·frivolous
one, it was not made an issue in this case,
and I agree that no purpose would be served
by setting the case for reargument on this
issue. In short, I adhere to my Conference
vote.
Sincerely yours,

r/ s '
I ,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

'/

,.

'

.·

>!

·,.
'

Harry:
I will await Bill Rehnquist's
Article III issue before making a final
Your opinion is most. interestinq.
Sincerely,

.J .;
•'.

r . .\

!.

'

·'

.

..

,'·

r- .- ;~

" '

)·

..

~.

CHAMBERS O F"

June 11 , 1980

..JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR .

RE:

No. 79-639

United States v. Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 11, 1980

Re:

79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation
of Indians

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.:§npuuu C!fomi of lltt ~dt .:§hrltg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June ll , 1980

Re:

79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.§u.prtmt <Q:ourt of tlrt pni..ttb j,ta.tte

Wasfrington. :ID. <q:.

20c5'1-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

DOS

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

June 11, 1980

RE:

No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation

I

have

attention
Justice

to

plowed

the

through

Article

Rehnquist.

this

III

endless

arguments

Although

HAB

has

tome

raised

with

at

produced

particular

Conference

a

document

by
only

slightly shorter than the D.C. phone book, I do think his treatment
of the Article III question was persuasive.
does

not

go

matters,

HAB

Congress

acted

waived res

looking

for

presents
under

confrontations

good
its

reasons

powers

to

judicata defenses that

Assuming that this Court
with

to

Congress

accept

pay

debts

over

such

jurisdiction:
and,

as

it might interpose;

2)

1)

sovereign,
the Klein

case involved congressional usurpation of the constitutional power of
the

Executive

Congress

to

attempted

make

pardons

and

of

the

to

reverse

the

Court's

judiciary

insofar

construction

of

as
the

constitutional effect of a pardon in Padleford; 3) Justice Cardozo's
Cherokee Nation opinion appears to be squarely on point, holding that
in an Indian treaty case Congress may waive its res judicata defense.
I
still

spoke to Justice Rehnquist' s

expect

to

dissent

on

the

clerk,

Article

III

who

said

issue.

that

they

(Reportedly

2.

Justice Rehnquist suggested that the dissent be different from HAB's
opinion "in every respect -- expecially length.")
be prudent to see what the dissent says.

I

think it would

/
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No. 79- 639

Sioux Nation of Indians et al.

JUN l 3

FT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

United States, Petitioner,
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On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

~,to

This case concerns the Black Hills of South Dakota, the J1':t...t_ S~
Great Sioux Reservation, and a colorful, and in many respects
~
,
tragic, chapter in the history of the Nation's West. Although-ti ~ ~
the litigation comes down to a claim of interest since 1877 J...A.. ~ ,
on an award of over $17 million, it is necessary, in order to
,
,
understand the controversy, to review at some length the
9 ~~
chronology of the case and its factual setting.

~~h..;;1
•
For over a century now the Sioux Nation has claimed tha~~
the United States unlawfully abrogated the Fort L!:lrami(-2-~
Treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, in Art. II of which th~ ~ .£...._
United States pledged that the Great Sioux Reservation, in-~~- .IJ
eluding the Black Hills, would be "set apart for the absolutep ... _._... <i
and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein ~ ~
named." !d., at 636. The Fort Laramie Treaty was con- i2. t{. $' , tfJb), f·
eluded at the culmination of the Powder River War of 1866-..,.,6f '
1867, a series of military engagements in which the Sioux
tribes, led by their great chief, Red Cloud, fought to protect
the integrity of earrlef-recognized treaty lands from the incursion of white settlers.1
1 The Sioux territory recogized under the Treaty of September 17, 1851 ,
·ee 11 Stat. 749, included all of the present State o.f South Dakota, and
parts of what is now Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota , and Montana .

.,
'.

79- 639-0PINION
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UN'1TED STATES

v. SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS

The For·t Laramie Treaty included several agreements central to the issues presented in this case. First, it established
the Great Sioux Reservation, a tract of land bounded on the
east by the Missouri River, on the south by the northern
border of the State of Nebraska, on the north by the fortysixth parallel of north latitude, and on the west by the one
hundred and fourth meridian of west longitude, 2 in addition
to certain reservations already existing east of the Missouri.
The United States "solemnly agree [ d]" that no unauthorized
persons ashall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or
reside in [this] terri tory." Ibid.
Second, the United States permitted members of the Sioux
tribes to select lands within the reservation for cultivation.
Td., at 637. In order to assist the Sioux in becoming civilized
farmers, the overnment romised to provide them with the
necessary services an materials, and with subsistence rations
for four years. I d., at 639.3
The Powder River War is described in some detail in D. Robinson, A
History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians, 356-381 ( 1904), reprinted in 2
South Dakota Historical Collections (1904). Red Cloud's career as a
warrior and statesman of the Sioux is rPcotmted in 2 G. Hebard & E.
Brininstool, The Bozeman Trail, 175-204 (1922) .
2 The b(•undaries of the reservation included approximately half the
area of what is now the State of South Dakota, including all of that State
west of the Missouri River save for a narrow strip in the far western
portion. The reservation also included a narrow strip of land west of
the Missouri and north of tbe border between North and Sduth Dakota.
3 The treaty called for the construction of schools and the provision of
teachers for the education of Indian children, tbe provision of seeds and
agricultural instruments to be used in the first four years of planting, and
the provision of blacksmiths, carpenters, millers, and engineers to perform work on the reservation. See 15 Stat. 637-638, 640. In addition,.
the United States agreed to deliver certain articles of clothing to each
Indian residing on the reservation, " on or before the first day of August
of each year, for thirty years." !d., at 638. An annual stipend of $10
per per~ on was to be appropriated for all those members of the Sioux
Nation who continued to engage in hunting; those who settled on the
retiervation to engage in farming would receiv·e $20. Ibid. Subsistence
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Third, in exchange for the benefits conferred by the treaty,
the Sioux agreed to relinquish their rights under the Treaty
of September 17, 1851, to occupy territories outside the reservation, while reserving their "right to hunt on any lands
north of North Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the
Smoky Hill river, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in
such numbers as to justify the chase." Ibid. The Indians
also expressly agreed to withdraw aU opposition to the building of railroads that did not pass over their reservation lands,
110t to engage .in attacks on settlers, and to withdraw their
opposition to the military posts and roads that had been
established south of the North Platte River. Ibid.
Fourth, Art. XII of the treaty provided:
"No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the
reservation herein described which may be held in common shall be of any validity or force as against the said
Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three
fourths of all the adult male Indians, occupying or interested in the same." lbid.4
The years following the treaty brought relative peace to
the Dakotas, all era of tranquility that was disturbed, however, by renewed speculation that the Black Hills, which were
included in the Great Sioux Reservation, contained vast quantities of gold and silver." In 1874 the Army planned and
rations of meat and flour (one pound of each per day) were to be provided for a period of four year:; to those Indians upon the reservation who
could not provide for their own needs. !d., at 639.
4 The Fort Laramie Treaty was considered by some commentators to
have been a complete victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux. In 1904 it
was described as "the only inst~nce in the history of the United States
where the government has gone to war and afterwards negotiated a peace
conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting nothmg in
return." Robinson, supra, n. I, at. 387.
5 The history of speculation concerning the presence of gold in the Black
Hills, which dated from early explorations by prospectors in the 1830'1$h
is cal?sulized in D . Jackson, Cu:;ter' · Gold 3-7 (1966).
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undertook an exploratory expedition into the Hills, both for
the purpose of establishing a military outpost from which to
~<e~ Sioux who had not accepted the terms of
'I th~F~-rt- La~~~~i~ Treaty, and for the purpose of investigating
"the country about which dreamy stories have been told."
D. Jackson, Custer's Gold 14 (1966) (quoting the 1873 annual report of Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, as
Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, to the
Secretary of War). Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong
Custer led the expedition of close to 1,000 soldiers and teamsters, and a substantial number of military and civilian .aides.
Custer's journey began at Fort Abraham Lincoln on the Missouri River on July 2, 1874. By the end of that month, they
had reached the Black Hills, and by mid-August had confirmed the presence of gold fields in that region. The discovery of gold was widely reported in newspapers across the
country.« Custer's florid descriptions of the mineral and timber resources of the Black Hills, aud the land's suitability for
grazing and cultivation, also received wide circulation, and
had the effect of creating an intense popular demand for the
"opening" of the Hills for settlement. 7 The only obstacle to
0 In 1974, the Center for Western Studies completed a project compiling
contemporary newspaper accounts of Custer's expedition. See H. Krause
& G. Olson, Prelude to Glory (1974). Several correspondents traveled
with Custer on the expedition and their dispatches were published by
newspapers both in the Midwest. and the East. ld., at 6.
7 SeE~ Robin~on, supra n. 1, at 408-410; A. Tallent, The Black Hill1; 130
{1975 reprint of 1899 ed .); J . Vaughn, The Reynolds Campaign on Powder RiVl'r a-4 (1961).
The Sioux regarded Custer's expedition in itself to be a violation of the
Fort Laramie Treaty. In later negotiations for ceso;ion of the Black Hills,
Cu:<ter '~ trail through the Hilb wa::; rPfPrrcd to hy a chief known ao> Fast
Bear Hi; "that thievf>S' road ." Jarkson, 11upra n. 5, at 24. Chroniclel'b
of the exprd1ticn, at least to an extent, have agreed. See id ., at 120;
G. Manypenuy, Our Indian Wardo> xxix, 296-2\J7 (1972 reprint Clf 1889
ec{.),
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"progress" was the Fort Laramie Treaty that reserved occupancy of the Hills to the Sioux.
Having promised the Sioux that the Black Hills were reserved to them, the United States Army was placed in the
position of having to threaten military force, and occasionally
to use it, to prevent prospectors and settlers from trespassing
on lands reserved to the Indians. For example, in September 1874, General Sheridan sent instructions to Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry, Commander of the Department of
Dakota, at Saint Paul, directing him to use force to prevent
companies of prospectors from trespassing on the Sioux reservation. At the same time, Sheridan let it be known that
he would "give a cordial support to the settlement of the
Black Hills," should Congress decide to "open up the country
for settlement, by extinguishing the treaty rights of the
Indians." App. 62-63. Sheridan's instructions were pub'lished in local newspapers. See id., at 63. 8
Eventually, however, the Executive Branch of the Government decided to abandon t~ treaty obligation to
preserve the integrity of
e wux tern ory. n a letter
dated November 9, 1875, to Terry, Sheridan reported that he
had met with President Grant, the Secretary of the Interior,
8

General William Tecumseh Sherman, Commanding General of the
Army, as quoted in the Saint Louis Globe in 1875, described tlw military's
task in keeping prospectors out of the Black Hills as "the same old story,
the ~tory of Adam and Eve and the forbidden fruit ." .Tackwn, supra
n. 5, at 112. In an interview with a correspondent frcm the Bismarck
Tribune, published September 2, 1874, Custer recognized the military's
obligation to keep all trespassers off the reservation lands, but stated that
he would recommend to Congress "the extinguishment of the Indian title
at the earliest moment practicable for military reasons." Krause &
Olson, supra n. 6, at 23:~. Given the ambivalence of feeling among the
commanding officPrs of the Army about thr practicality and desirability
of its treaty obligations, it is perhaps not surprising that one chronicler
of Sioux history would describe the Government's efforts to dislodge invading settlers from the Black Hills as ·"feeble." F . Hans, ·The Grea-t
Sioux Nation 522 ( 1964 reprint).
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and the Secretary of War, and that the President had decided
that the military should make no further resistence to the
occupation of the Black Hills by miners, "it being his belief
that such resistance only increased their desire a.nd complicated the troubles." Id., at 59. These orders were to be
enforced "quietly," ibid., and the President's deCision was to
remain "confidential." !d., at 59-60 (letter from Sheridan
to Sherman).
With the Army's withdrawal from its role as enforcer of the
Fort Laramie Treaty, the influx of settlers into the Black
Hills increased. The Government concluded that the only
practical course was to secure to the citizens of the United
States the right to mine the Black Hills for gold. Toward
that end, the Secretary of the Interior, in the spring of 1875,
ap )Ointed a commission to nrgotia.t e with the Sioux. The
commission was eaaea oy
i lam . AliSOn. The tribal
leaders of the Sioux were aware of the mineral value of the
Black Hills and refused to sell the land for a price less than
$70 million. The commission offered the Indians an annual
rental of $400,000, or payment of $6 million for absolute
relinquishment of the 'Black Hills. The negotiations broke
down. 9
In the winter of 1875-1876, many of the Sioux were hunting in the unceded territory north of the North Platte River,
reserved to them for that purpose in the Fort Laramie-Treaty.
On December 6, 1875, for reasons that are not entirely clear,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent instructions to the
Indian agents on the reservation to notify those hunters that
if they did not return to the reservation agencies by January
31, 1876, they would 'be treated as "hostiles." Given the
9

The Report of the Allison Commission to the Secretary of the Interior

is contained in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
( 1875), App. 146, 158-195. The unsuccessful negotiations are described
in some detail in Jachon, S'Upra n. 5, at 116-118, and in Robin::>on, s'Upr-a
n. 1, at 416-421.

,.
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severity of the winter, compliance with these instructions was
impossible. On February 1, the Secretary of the Interior
nonetheless relinquished jurisdiction over all hostile Sioux,
including those Indians exercising their treaty-protected hunting rights, to the War Department. The Army's campaign ~
against the "hostiles" led to Sitting Bull's notable victory
over Custer's forces at the ba e f the Little Big Horn on
June 25. That victory, of course, was s ort- 1ve , and those
Indians who surrended to the Army were returned to the reservation, and deprived of their weapons and horses, leaving
them completely dependent for survival on rations provided
them by the Government. 10
In the meantime, Congress was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the failure of the Sioux living on the reservation
to become self-sufficient. 11 The Sioux' entitlement to sub10 The~e events arc dcscribrd by Manypenny, supra n. 7, at 294-321,
and Robinson, supm, n. 1, at 422-438.
11 In Dakota Twilight (1976), a history of the Standing Rock Sioux,
Edward A. Milligan states:
"Nearly seven year~ had elapsed since the signing of the Fort Laramie
trl"aty and still the Sioux w!"re no closer t.o a condition of self-support
than when the treaty was signed. In the meantime the government had
expended nearly thirteen million dollars for their support. The future
treatment of the Sirux became a mat.ter of serious moment, even if viewed
from no higher standard than that of economics." ld., at 52.
One hi;;torian has described the ration provisions of the Fort Laramie
Treaty as part of a broader reservation system designed by Congress to
convert nomadic tribesmen into farmers. Hagan, The Reservation Policy:
Too Litt!e and Too Late, in Indian-White Relations: A Persistent Paradox 157-169 (J. Smith & R. Kvasnicka rd,;., 1976). In words applicable
to conditions on the Sioux reservation during the years in question, Professor Hagan stated:
"The idea had bE'€11 to supplemrnt thr food the Indians obtained by hunting until they could subsist completely by farming. Clauses in the treaties
permitted hunting out;;ide the strict boundaries of the reservations, but
the inevitable cla~hes between off-re~ervation hunting parties and whites
led this privilege to be first restricted and then eliminated. The Indiana

..
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sistence rations under the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty
had expired in 1872. Nonetheless, in each of the two following years, over $1 million was appropriated for feeding the
Sioux. In August 1876, Congress enacted an appropriations
bill providing that "hereafter there shall be no appropriation
made for the subsistence" of the Sioux, unless they first relinquished their rights to the hunting grounds outside the
reservation, ceded the Black Hills to the United States, and
reached some accommodation with the Government that
would be calculated to enable them to become self-supporting. Act of August 15, 1816, 19 Stat. 176, 192. 12 Toward
this end, Congress requested the President to appoint another
commission to negotiate with the Sioux for the cession of the
Black Hills.
This commission, headed by George Manypenny, arrived
in the Sioux country in early September and commenced
meetings with the head men of the various tribes. - The members of the commission impressed upon the Indians that the
became dependent uyon government rations more quickly than had been
anticipated, while their conv€'rsion to agriculture lagged behind schedule.
"The quantity of food supplied by the government was never sufficient
for a full ration, and the quality wa frequently poor. But in view of the
fact that most treaties carried no provision for rations at all, and for
others they were limited to four years, th€' members of Congress tended
to look upon rations as a gratuity that should be terminated as quickly
as possible. The Indian Service and military personnel generally agreed
that it was better to feed than to fight, but to the typical late nineteenthcentury meml>er of Congress, not yet exposed to doctrines of social welfare, there was :something obscene about grown men and women drawing
free rations. Appropriations for Eubsistence con:,equently fell below the
levels requested by the secretary of the interior.
"That starvation and near-starvation conditions were present on some
of the ~;ixty-odd reservations every year for the quarter century after the
Civil War is manifest." Id, at 161 (footnotes omitted).
12 The chronolrgy of the enactment of this bill does not necessarily support the view that it was pa1.1sed in reaction to Custer's Jefeat at the
Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1876, although some historia·ns
have taken a contrary view. See Jack;;on, supra n. 5, at 119.

~·

79 639- OPINION
t •NITED STATES v. SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS

9

United States no longer had any obligation to provide them
with subsistence rations. The commissioners brought with
them the text of a treaty that had been prepared in advance;
The principal provisions of this treaty were that the Sioux
would relinquish their rights to the Black Hills and other
lands west of the one h uudred and third meridian, and their
rights to hunt in the uuceded territories to the north, in ex-·
change for subsistence_rations for as long as they would be
needed to ensure the Sioux' survival. ln setting out to ob-'
tlain the tribes' agreement t . IS rea ,
omm1sswn
ignored the stipulation of th~ Fort Lar:amie Treat that any
cession of the lands contained wjthm t e reat ioux Reservation would have to be joined in by three-fourths of the
adult males. Instead, the ---..
treaty was presented just to Sioux'
chiefs and their leading men. It was signed by only 10% of
the adult male Sioux po ulation. 18 ~
13

The commi8sion's negotiations with the chiefs and head men is deIScribed by Robin~on, supra n. 1, at 439-442. He statr~:
"As will be readily understood, the making of a treaty was a forced put,
so· far as the Indians were concerned. Defeated, disarmrd, dismounted, ·
they wrre at the mercy of a t:~uperior power and there was no alternative ·
but to accept the conditions imposed upon tl1ein. This they did with as
good grace as possible under all of the conditions existing." !d., at 442 .·
Another early chrcnicler of the Black Hills region wrote of the treaty's
provisions in the following chauvinistics terms :
"It will be seen by studying the provisions of this treaty, that by its
terms the Indians from a material standpoint lost much, and gained but
little. By the first article they losr all rights to the unceded territory in
Wyoming from which white settlers had then before been altogether excluded ; by the second they relinquish all right to the Black Hill~, and the
frrtile valley of the Belle Fourche in Dakota, without additional material
compensation ; by the third conceding the right of way over the unceded
portions of their reservation ; by the fourth they receive such ~upplies
only, as were provided by the treaty of 1868, restricted as to the points
for receiviPg them. The only real gain to the Indians seems to be em- bodied in the fifth article of the treaty [Government's obligation to provide subsistence rationl:i].J The I~ dian;:;, doubtless, reaHzed .that the -Black~!'
Hills was destined soon to slip out of their grasp, regardless of their
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Congress resolved the impasse by enacting the 1876 "agree~
ment" into law as the Act of Feb. 28, 1877 (1877 Act).
19 Stat. 254. The Act had the effect of abrogating the
earlier Fort Laramie Treaty, and of implementing the terms
of the Manypenny Commission's uagreement" with the Sioux
leaders. 14
· claims, and therefore thought it best to yield to the inevitable, and accept
whatever was offered them.
"They were assured of a continuance of their regular daily rations, and
certa.in annuities in clothing each year, guaranteed by the treaty of 1868,
and what more could they ask or desire, than that a living be provided
for themselves, their wives, their children, and all their relaticns, includ~
ing squaw meu, indirectly, thus leaving them free to live their wild, careless, unrestrained life, exempt from all the burdens and responsibilities of
civilized existence'? In view of the fact that there are thousands who are
obliged to earn their bread and butter by the sweat of their brows, and
that have hard work to keep the wolf from the door, they should be satisfied ." Tallent, supra n. 7, at 133-134.
u. The 1877 Act "ratified and confirmed" the agreement reached by the
Manypenny Commission with theBioux tribes. 19 Stat. 254. It altered
the boundaries of the Great Sioux Reservation by adding sJme 900,000
acre::J of land to the north, while carving out virtually all that portion of
the reservation between the one hundred and third and one hundred and
fourth meridian:;, including the Black Hills, an art'a of well over 7 million
acres. The Indians also relinquished their rights to hunt in the ~unceded
lands recognized by the Fort Laramie Treaty, and agreed that three
wagon roads could be cut through tlleir reservation . /d., at 255.
In exchange, the Government reaffirmed its oblig'ation to provide all
annuities called for by the Fort Laramie Treaty, and "to provide all
necessary aid to assist the said Indiims in the work of civilization; to
furnish to them schools and instruction in mechanical and agricultural
arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868." ld., at 2'56. In addition,
every individual was to receive fixed .quantities of beef or bacon and flour,
and other foodstuffs, in the discretion of the Commissicner of Indian
Affairs, which "shall be continued until the Indians are able to support
them:;elves." 1b1d. The provision of ration~ was to be conditioned, however, on the attendance at school by Indian children, and on the labor of
those who resided on lands suitable for farming. The Government also
,promised to as;ist the Siol,Jx in finding markets for their crops and in ob~
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The passage of the 1877 Act legitimized the settlers' invasion of the Black Hills, but throughout the years it has been
regarded by the Sioux as a breach of this Nation's solemn
obligation to reserve the Hills in perpetuity for occupation
by the Indians. One historian of the Sioux Nation commented on Indian reaction to the Act in the following words:
"The Sioux thus affected have not gotten over talking
about that treaty yet, and during the last few years they
have maintained an organization called the Black Hills
rrreaty Association , which holds meetings each year at
the various agencies for the purpose of studying the
treaty with the intention of presenting a claim against
the government for additional reimbursement for the
territory ceded under it. Some think that Uncle Sam
owes them about $9,000,000 on the deal, but it will probably be a hard matter to prove it." F. Fiske, The Tam~
ing of the Sioux, 132 (1917).
Fiske's words were to prove prophetic.

II
Prior to 1946, Congress had not enacted any mechanism of
general applicability by which Indian tribes could litigate
treaty claims against the United StateS. 15 The Sioux, however, after years of lobbying, succeeded in obtaining from
Congress the passage of a special jurisdictional act which
provided them a forum for adjudication of all claims against
the United States "under any treaties, agreements, or laws of
Congress or for the misappropriation of any of the funds or
taining employment in the performance of government work on the reservation. Ibid.
Later congressional actions having the effect of further reducing the
domain of the Great Sioux Reservation are described in Rosebud Sioux
'l'ribe v. Kneip , 430 U. S. 584, 589 (1977).
15 See § 9 of the Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 767; § 1 of t4e
'ru.cker Act of Marrh 3, 1887, ch . 359, 24 Stat. .505,
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lands of said tribe or band or bands thereof." Act of June 3,
1920, 41 Stat. 738. Pursuant to this statute, the Sioux, in
1923, filed a petition with the Court of Claims alleging that
the Government had taken the Black Hills without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This claim
was dismissed by that court in 1942. In a lengthy and unanimous opinion, the court concluded that it was not authorized by the Act of June 3, 1920, to question whether the
compensation afforded the Sioux by Congress in 1877 was an
adequate price for the Black Hills, and that the Sioux' claim
in this regard was a moral claim not protected by the Just
Compensation Clause. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct.
Cl. 613 (1942) , cert. denied, 318 U. S. 789 (1943) .
In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission
Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U. S. C. § 70 et seq., creating a new
forum to hear and determine all tribal grievances that had
arisen previously. In 1950, counsel for the Sioux resubmitted the Black Hills claim to the Indian Claims Commission. The Commission initially ruled that the Sioux had
failed to prove their case. Sioux Tribe v. United States,
2 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 646 (1954) , aff'd, 146 F. Supp. 229 (Ct.
Cl. 1956) . The Sioux filed a motion with the Court of
Claims to vacate its judgment of affirmance, alleging that the
Commission's decision had been based on a record that was
inadequate, due to the failings of the Sioux' former counsel.
This motion was granted and the Court of Claims directed
the Commission to consider whether the case should be reopened for the presentation of additional evidence. On November 19, 1958, the Commission entered an order reopening
the case and announcing that it would reconsider its prior
judgment on the merits of the Sioux claim. App. 265-266;
see Si<YUx Tr·ibe v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 912 (1968)
(summary of proceedings) .
Following the Sioux' filing of an amended petition, claiming again that the 1877 Act constituted a taking of the Black
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Hills for which just compensation had not been paid, there
ensued a lengthy period of procedural sparring between the
Indians and the Government. Finally, in October 1968, the
Commission set down three questions for briefing and determination: (1) What land and rights did the United States
acquire from the Sioux by the 1877 Act? (2) What, if any,
consideration was given for that land and those rights? and
(3) If there was no consideration for the Government's acquisition of the land and rights under the 1877 Act, was there
any payment for such acquisition? App. 266.
Six years later, by a 4-1 vote, the Qommiss!Qn rei!Q..hed a
preliminary decision on these questions. Sioux Nation v.
Un~nd. Cl. Comm'n 151 (1974). The Commission first held that the 1942 Court of Claims decision did
not bar the SiOux' Fifth Amendment taking claim through
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The Commission
concluded that the Court of Claims had dismissed the earlier
suit for lack of jurisdiction, and that it had not determined
the merits of the Black Hills claim. The Commission then
went on to find that Congress, in 1877, had made no effort to
give the Sioux full value for the ceded reservation lands.
The only new obligation assumed by the Government in exchange for the Black Hills was its promise to provide the
Sioux with subsistence rations, an obligation that was subject
to several limiting conditions. See n. 14, supra. Under
these circumstances, the Commission concluded that the consideration given the Indians in the 1877 Act had no relationship to the value of the property acquired. Moreover, there
was no indication in the record that Congress ever attempted
to relate the value of the rations to the value of the Black
Hills. Applying· the principles announced by the Court of
Claims in Three Trib es of Fort Berthold Reservation v.
United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 543, 390 F. 2d 686 ( 1968), the
Commission concluded that Congress had acted pursuant to
its power of eminent doma.in when it passed the 1877 Act,

79-6:39-0PINION
14

U ITED STATES v. SIOUX NATION OF INPIANS

rather than as a trustee for the Sioux, and that the Government must pay the Indians just compensation for the taking
of the Black Hills. 16
The Government filed an appeal with the Court of Claims
from the Commission's interlocutory order, arguing alternatively that the Sioux' Fifth Amendment claim should have
been barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, or that the 1877 Act did not effect a taking of the Blac·k
Hills for which just compensation was due. Without reaching the merits, the Court of Claims held that the Black Hills
claim was barred by the res judicata effect of its 1942 decision. United States v. Sioux Nation, 207 Ct. Cl. 234, 518
F. 2d 1298 (1975). The court's majority recognized that the
practical impact of the question presented was limited to a
determination of whether or not an award of interest would
be available to the Indians. This followed from the Government's failure to appeal the Commission's hold --~"--at it
had acquired the Blac·k Hills through a course of unfair and
disi!__onorable ~ali~g for which the SiOux were entitled to
damages, without mterest, under § 2 of the Indian Claims
Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1050, 25 U. S. C. ~ 70a (5). Only
if the acquisition of the 'Black Hills amounted to an uncon.
16 The Commission determined that the fair market value of the Black
Htlls as of February 28, 1977, was $17.1 million. In addition, the
United States was held liable for gold removed by trrspassing prosprctors
prior to that. date, with a fair market value in the ground of $450,000.
The Commission determined that the Govrrnment should receive a credit
fer all amounts it had paid to tJH• Indians over the years in complinnce
with its obligations under the 1877 Act Tht•se amounts were to be
credited again~t the fair market. value of thr lands and gold t.akrn, and
interest as it accrued. The Commission decided that further procredings
would be necessary to compute the amounts to be credited nnd the value
of the rights of way across the reservation that the Government also had
acquired through the 1877 Act.
Chairman Kuykendall dissented in part from the Commission's judgment, arguing that the Sioux' taking claim was barred by the res juUicata
· effect of .t he 1942 Co.t1rt of Chums decision.
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stitutional taking would the Sioux be entitled to interest,
/d., at 237, 518 F. 2d, at 1299. 17
The court affirmed the Commission's holding that a want
offair and honorable dealings in this case was evidenced, and
lJ
held that the Sioux thus would be entitled to an award of at cp J
least $17.5 million for the lands surrendered ru;dfor the gold
taken bY"'t'fesp'7l8;ing prospectors prior to passage of the 1877
Act. See n. 16, supra. The Court also remarked upon
President Grant's duplicity in breaching the Government's
treaty obligationtokeep trespassers out of the Black Hills,
and the pattern of duress practiced by the Government on
the starving Sioux o get em o agree o t e sa e of the
Black Hills. The court conCluded: "A more ripe and rank
case of dishonorable dealings will never, in all pr015aBittty,"ire
fo~ is not, taken as a whole, the disgrace it now pleases some persons to believe." /d., at 241,
518 F . 2d, at 1302.

I

See United Stutes v. T£/lamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 49 (1951) (recognizing that the " traditional rule" is that interest is not to be awarded on
claims against the United States absent an express statutory provision
to the contrary and that the "only exception arises when the taking
entitles the claimant to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment").
In United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U. S. 119, 121 (1938), the
Court stated: "The established rule is that the taking of property by
the United States in the exertion of its power of eminent domain implies
a promise to pay just compensation, i. e., value at the time of the taking
plus an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that value
paid contemporaneously with the taking."
The Court of Claims also noted that subsequent to the Indian Claims
Commission's judgment, Congress had enacted an amendment to 25
U. S. C. § 70a, providing generally that expenditures made by the Government "for food , rations, or provisions shall not be deemed payments on
the claim." Act of October 27, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. 1499. Thus, the
Government would no longer be entitled to an offset from any judgment.
eventually awarded the Sioux based on its appropriations for subsistence
rations in the years following the passage of the 1877 ·Act. 207 Ct. Cl.,
at :240,· 518 F. 2d 1 at 1301. See n. 16 1 supra.
17
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Nonetheless, the court held that the merits of the Sioux'
/'A
taking claim had b~en re~i~nd whether resolved C f ~
"rightly or wrongly," id., at 249,~2d, at 1306, t~m ;J~ L~
was now barred by res judicata. The court observed that in-;
terest could not be awar e
Sioux on judgments obtained ....,.<.h_
pursuant to the Indian Claims Commission Act, and that "1A~
while Congress could correct this situation, the court could /~..._-----. not. /bid. 18 The Sioux petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari, but that petition was denied. 423 U. S. 1016
(1975).
The case returned to the Indian Claims Commission, where
the value of the rights of way obtained by the Government
through the 1877 Act was determined to be $3,484, and where
it was decided that the Government had made no payments
to the Sioux that could be considered as offsets. App. 316.
The Government then moved the Commission to enter a final
award in favor of the Sioux in the amount of $17.5 million,
see n. 16, supra, but the Commission deferred entry of final
judgment in view of legislation then pending in Congress that
dealt with this case.
On March 13, 1978, Congress passed a statute providing for
Court of Claims review of the merits of the Indian Cla.ims
Commission's judgment that the 1877 Act effected a. taking
of the Black Hills, without regard to the defenses of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The statute authorized the
Court of Claims to take new evidence in the case, and to conduct its review of the merits de novo. Pub. L. 95-243, 92
Stat. 153, amending § 20 (b) of the Indian Claims Commission Act. See 25 U. S. C. §
b) (1976 ed., Supp. II).
Acting pursuant to that statute, a majority of the Court of
Claims, sitting en bane, in an opinion by Chief Judge Fried18 Judge Davis dissented with respect to the court's holding on res
judicata , arguing that the Sioux had not had the opportunity to present
their claim fully in 1942. 207 Ct. Cl., at 249, 518 F . 2d, at 1306.
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man, affirmed the Commission's holding that the 1877 Act
e~ng of the Black Hills and of rights of way across
the reservation. Sioux Nation v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl.
- , 601 F. 2d 1157 (1979). 19 In doing so, the court applied
the test it had earlier articulated in Fort Berthold, 182 Ct. Cl.,
at 553, 390 F. 2d, at 691, asking whether Congress had made
"a good faith effort to give the Indians the full value of the
land," 220 Ct. Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1162, in order to
decide whether the 1877 Act had effected a taking or whether
it had been a noncompensable act of congressional guardianship over tribal property. The court characterized the Act
as a taking. an exercise of Congress' power of eminent domain
over Indian property. It distinguished broad statements
seemingly leading to a contrary result in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), as inapplicable to a case involving
a claim for just compensation. ld., at - , 601 F. 2d, at
1170. 20
The court thus held that the Sioux were entitled to an
award of interest, at the annua1 rate of 5%, on the principal
sum of $17.1 million, dating from 1877. 21
10 While affirming the Indian Claims CommiEsion's detennination that
the acquisition of the Black Hills and the rights-of-way acro::s the reservation constituted takings, the court rever~ea tbe Commission's determination that the mining of gold from tbe Black Hills by prospectors prior
to 1877 also constituted a taking. The value of tl1e gold, therefore, could
not be considered as part of the principal on which interest wculd be
paid to the Sioux. 220 Ct. Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1171-1172.
20 The Lone Wolf decision it~elf involved an action by tribal leaders to
enjoin the enforcement of a statute that had the effe~t of abrogating the
provisions of an earlier-enacted treaty with an Indian tribe. See Part
IV-B. iufra.
21 Judge Nichols concurred in the result, and aU of the court'~ opinion
except that portion distinguishing Lone Wolf. He would have he1d Lone
1Volf's principles inapplicable to this case becau:se Congre~~ had not
created a record showing that it had considered the compen:sation afforded
the Sioux under the 1877 Act to be adequate con~ideration for the Black
Hills. He did not believe that Lone Wolf could be distinguished on the
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We granted the Government's petition for a writ of certio(1979), in order to review the important
rari, U. S. constitutional questions presented by this case, questions not
only of long-standing concern to the Sioux, but also of significant economic import to the Government.

III
Having twice denied petitions for certiorari in this litigation, see 318 U. S. 789 (1943); 423 U. S. 1016 (1975), we
are confronted with it for a third time as a result of the
amendment, above noted, to the Indian Claims Commission
Act of 1946,25 U.S. C. §70s (b) (1976 ed., Supp. II), which
directed the Court of Claims to review the merits of the
Black Hillit;ki'ngs
Witli_out regilla to the defense of
res judicata. The amendment, approved March 13, 1978,
p;ovides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of la.w, upon application by the claimants within thirty days from the
date of the enactment of this sentence, the Court of
Claims shall review on the merits, without regard to the
defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel, that portion of the determination of the Indian Claims Commission entered February 15, 1974, adjudging that the
Act of February 28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254), effected a taking
of the Black Hills portion of the Great Sioux Reservation in violation of the fifth amendment, and shall enter

Claun

ground that it involved an action for injunctive relief rather than a claim
for just compensation. 220 Ct. Cl., a t - , 601 F. 2d, at 1175-1176.
Judge Bennett, joined by Judge Kunzig, dissented. The dissentt:'r>'3
would have read Lone Wolf broadly to hold that it was within Congress'
ronptituticnal power to dispose of tribal property without regard to good
fnith or the amount of compensation givrn. "The law wr ~hould rtpply
is that once Congress has, through negotiation or statute, recognizt:'d the
Indian tribes' rights in the property, has disposed of it, and has given
value to the Indians for it, that is the end of the matter." !d., a t - ,
601 F. 2d, at 1182.

..
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judgmeut accordingly. In conducting such review, the
Court shaH receive and consider any additioual evidence,
including oral testimon y, that either party may wish to
provide on the issue of a fifth amendment taking and
shall determi11e that issur de novo " H2 Stat. 153.
Before turning to the ments of the Court of Claims' conclusion that the Act of February 28, 1877, effected a taking
of the Black Hills, we must consider the question whether
Congress, in enacting this 1978 amendment, "has inadvertently passed the limit which separat
egislati ve from the
judicial power." United States . Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 147
(1872).
A
There arc two objections that might be raised to the constitutionality of this amendment, each framed in terms of the
doctrine of separatiOn of powers. The first would be that
Congress Impermissibly ha.s disturbed the finality of a judicial
decree by rendering the Court of Claims' earlier judgments in
this case mere advisory opinions. See Hayburn's Case, 2
Dall. 409, 410-414 (1792) (setting forth the views of three
Circuit Courts, including among their complements Chief
Justice Jay, and Justices Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and I redell,
that the Act of March 23, 1792, 1 Stat. 243, was unconstitutional because it subjected the decisions of the Circuit Courts
concerning eligibility for pension benefits to review by the
Secretary of War and the Congress). The objection would
take the form that Congress, in directing the Court of Claims
to reach the merits of the Black Hills claim, efi'ectively reviewed and reversed that court's 1975 judgment that the
claim was barred by res judicata, or its 194 Judgment that
the claim was not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.
Such legislative review of a judicial decision would interfere
with the independent functions of the Judiciary.
The second objection would be that Congress overstepped
its bounds by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction . to
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decide the merits of the Black Hills claim, while prescribing
a rule for decision that left the Court no adjudicatory function to perform. See United States v. 'Klein, 13 Wall., at
146; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 467-468 ( 1944)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Of course, in the context of this
amendment, that objection wou1d have to be framed in terms
of Congress' removal of a sh1gle issue from the Court of
Claims' purview, the question whether res judicata or collateral estoppel barred the Sioux' claim. For in passing the
amendment, Congress left no doubt that the Court of Claims
was free to decide the merits of the takings claim in accordance with the evidence it found and applicable rules of law.
See n. 23, infra.
These objections to the constitutionality of the amendment
were not raised by the Government before the Court of
Claims. At oral argument in this Court, counsel for the
U'nited States, upon explicit questioning advanced the position that the amendment was not beyond the limits of legislative power. 22 The question whether the amendment
impermissibly interfered with judicial power was debated,
however, in the House of Representatives, and that body concluded that the Government's waiver of a "technical legal
defense" in order to permit the Court of Claims to reconsider the merits of the Black Hills claim was within CongTess•
power to enact.28
In response to a question from the bench, government counsel stated:
" I think Congress is entitled to ~ay, 'You may have another opportunity
to litigate your lawsuit." Tr. of Oral Arg. ZO.
23 R·e presentative Gudger of North Carolina persistently argued the view
that the amendment unconstitutionally int.erefered with the power~:; of the
Judiciary. He dissented from the Committee Report in support of the
amendment's enactment, stating :
"I do not feel that. when the Federal Judiciary has adjudicated a matter
through appella.te review and no error has been found by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the application by the lower court (in this
instance the Court of Claims) of the doctrine of res judicata or collatera1
e:;tol>pel that the Congress of the United State,s should enact legislati<m.
22

·.
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The question debated on the floor of the House is one the
answer to which is not immediately apparent. It requires
us to examine the proper role of Congress and the courts in
which has the effect of reversing the decision of the Judiciary." H. R.
Rep. No. 95-529, p. 17 (1977).
Repre:oentative Gudger stated that he could support a bill to grant a
special appropriation to the Sioux Nation, acknowledging that it wall for
the purpo~e of extinguishing Congress' moral obligation arising from the
Black Hills claim, "but I cannot justify in my own mind this exerci;;e of
congressional review of a judicial decis!on which I consider contravenes
our €xclu:;ively legislative responsibility under the separation of powers
doctrine." !d., at 18.
The Congressman, in the House debates, elaborated upon his views on
the ccnstituticnality of the amendment. He stated that the amendment
would create "a real and serious departure from the separation-of-powers
doctrine, which I think should continue to govern us and has governed
us in the past." 124 Cong. Rec. H897 (Feb. 9, 1978). He continued:
"I submit that this bill has the precise and exact effect of rever~ing a
decillion of the Court of Claims which has heretofore been sustained by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, it places the Congress
of the United States in the position of reviewing and reversing a judicial
decillion in direct violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine so basic
to our tripartite form of government.
"I call to your attention that, in this instance, we are not asked to
chango the law, applicable uniformly to all cases of like nature throughout
the land, but that this bill proposes to change the application of the law
with respect to one case only. In doing this, we are not legislating, we
are adjudicating. Moreover, we are performing the adjudicatory function with respect to a case on which the Supreme Court of the United
States has acted. Thus, in this in~tance, we propose to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of our land." Ibid.
Repre::;entative Gudger's views on the effect of the amendment vis-a-vis
the independent powers of the Judiciary were not shared by his colleagues ..
Representative Roncalio lltated:
"I want to emphas~ze that the bill doe::; not make a congressional deter-·
mination of whether or not the United States violated the Fifth Amend~
ment . It does not say that the Sioux are entitled to the interest on the·
$17,500,000 award . It says that the court will review the fact~ and law
in the case and determine that quetition." !d., at H898.
Representative Roncalio altio informed the Hou;;e that Congrel:is in the·
pa,;t had enacted li>gislation waiving the defenl:ie of res judicata in priv.at~
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recognizing and determining claims against the United States,
in light of more general principles concemiug the legislative
claims rases, and had done so twice with respect to Indian claims. Ibid.
He mentioned the Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 139, 21 Stat. 504 (which
actually waived the effect of a prior award made to the Choctaw Nation
by the Senate), nnd the Act of February 7, 1925, ch. 148, 43 Stat. 812
(authorizing the Court of Claim:,; and the Supreme Court to consider
claim;; of the Dealware Tribe "de novo, upon a legnl and equitable basis,
and without regard to any decision, finding, or settlement heretofore had
in respect of any such claims"). Both those enactments were also brought
to the attention of a Senate ;;ubcommittee in hearings on thi;; amendment
conducted during the previous legislative se;;;;ion. See Hearings on S: 2780
before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on
Interior and InHular Affairs, 94th Con g., 2d Ses~:;., 16-17 ( 1976) (letter
from Morris Thompson, Commiosioner of Indian Affairs). The enactment ~ referred to by Representative Roncalio were construed, re:pectively. in Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1, 29-32 (1886),
and Delaware Tribe v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 368 (1932).
Repre~entative Pres:;ler also responded to Repre;;entative Gudger's interpretation of the proposed amendment, arguing that "[w]r are, inde2d,
here a;;king for a review and providing the groundwork for a review. I
do not believe that we would be reviewing a dec;sion; indeed, the same
decision might be reached." 124 Cong. Rec. H899 (Feb. 9, 1978).
Earlier, Representative Meeds clearly had articulated the prevailing congressional view on the effect of the propC>sed amendment. After summarizing the history of the Black Hills litigation, he stated:
"I go through that rather complicated history for the purpos·e of pointing out, to the Members that the purpose of thi~:; legislation is not to
decide the matter on the merits. That is still for the court to do. · The·
purpooe of thi::; legislation is only to waiYe the defen::;e of re;; judicata and
to waive this technical defense, as we have done in a number of other
in::;ta.nces in this body, so this most important claim can get before the'
courts again and can be decided without a technical defense and on the
merits ." !d., at H668 (Feb. 6, 1978).
See a!w S. Rep. No. 95-112, p. 6 (1977) ("The enactment of [the amend-·
ment1 is needed to waive certain legal prohibitions so that the Sioux
tribal claim may be considered on its merits before an appropriate · judicial
forum.") ; H. R. Rep . No. 95-529 , p. 6 (1977) ("The enactment of [the·
amendmentJ is needed to waive certain technical legal defens;>s so that theSioux tribal claim may be considered on its merits before an appropriate·
judicial forum. "),

·'
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ami judicial roles ill our tripartite system of government. Our
examination of the amendment's effect, and this Court's precedents, leads us to conclude that neither of the two separation
of powers objections described above is presented by this
legislation.

B
Our starting point is Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270
U. S. 476 (1926). That decision concerned the Special Act
of Congress, dated March 3, 1919, 40 Stat. 1316, conferring
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims "to hear, consider, and
determine the claim of the Cherokee Nation against the
United States for interest, in addition to all other interest
heretofore allowed and paid, alleged to be owing from the
United States to the Cherokee Nation on the funds arising
from the judgment of the Court of Claims of May eighteenth,
11ineteen hundred and five. " In the judgment referred to by
the Act, the Court of Claims had allowed 5% simple interest
on four Cherokee claims, to accrue from the date of liability.
Cherokee Nation v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 252 (1905).
This Court had affirmed that judgment, including the interest
award. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 202 U. S. 101,
123- 126 (1906). Thereafter, and following payment of the
judgment, the Cherokee presented to Congress a new claim
that they were entitled to compound interest on the lump
sum of principal and interest that had accrued up to 1895.
It was this claim that prompted Congress, in 1919, to reconfer
,jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to consider the Cherokee's
entitlement to that additional interest.
Ultimately, this Court held that the Cherokee were not
entitled to the payment of compound interest on the original
judgment awarded by the Court of Claims. 270 U. S., at
487- 496. Before turning to the merits of the interest claim,
however, the Court considered "the effect of the Act of 1919
in referring the issue in this case to the Court of Claims.''
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270 U. S., at 485-486. The Court's conclusion concerning
that question bears close examination:
"The judgment of this Court in the suit by the Cherokee
Nation against the United States, in April, 1906 (202
U. S. 101), already referred to, awarded a large amount
of interest. The question of interest was considered and
decided, and it is quite clear that but for the special Act
of 1919, above quoted, the question here mooted would
have been foreclosed as res judicata. In passing the
Act, Cougress must have been well advised of this, and
the only possible construction therefore to be put upon
it is that Congress has therein expressed its desire, so far
as the question of interest is concerned, to waive the
effect of the judgment as res judicata, and to direct the
Court of Claims to re-examine it and determine whether
the interest therein allowed was all that should have
been allowed, or whether it should be found to be as now
claimed by the Cherokee Nation. The Solicitor General, representing the Government, properly concedes this
to be the correct view. 'l'he power of Congress to waive
S'Uch an adjudioation of course is clear." 270 U. S., at
486 (last emphasis supplied).
The holding in Cherokee Nation that Congress has the
power to waive the res judicata efl'ect of a prior judgment
entered in the Government's favor on a claim against the
United States is dispositive of the question considered here.
Moreover, that holding is consistent with a substantial body
of precedent affirming tbe broad constitutional power of Congress to define and "to pay the Debts . . . of the United
States." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. That precedent
speaks directly to the separation of powers objections discussed
above.
The scope of Congress' power to pay the Nation's debts
see:ms fi.r.st to have been construed by this Court in United
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States v. Realty Company, 163 U.S. 427 (1896). There, the
Court stated:
"The term 'debts' includes those debts or claims which
rest upon a merely equitable or honorary obligation, and
which would not be recoverable in a court of law if existing against an individual. The nation, speaking broadly,
owes a 'debt' to an individual wben bis c1aim grows out
of general princip1es of right and justice; when, in other
words, it is based upou considerations of a moral or
merely honorary nature, such as are binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual, although the debt
could obtain no recognition in a court of law. The power
of Congress extends at least as far as the recognition and
payment of claims against the government which are
thus founded. " ld., at 440.

Other decisions clearly establish that Congress may recogllize its obligation to pay a moral debt not only by direct
appropriation, but also by wa.iving an otherwise valid defense
to a legal claim against the United States, as CongTess did in
this case and in Cherokee Nation. Although, the Court in
Cherokee Nation did not expressly tie its conclusion that
Congress had the power to waive the res judicata effect of a
judgment in favor of the United States to Congress' constitutional power to pay the Nation's debts, the Cherokee
Nation opinion did rely on the decision in Nock v. United
States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451 (1867). See 270 U. S., at 486.
In N ock, the Court of Claims was confronted with the
precise question whether Congress invaded judicial power
when it enacted a joint resolution, 14 Stat. 608, directing that
court to decide a damage claim against the United States "in
accordance with the principles of equity and justice," even
though the merits of the claim previously had been resolved
in the Government's favor. The court rejected the Government's argument that the joint resolution was unconstitutional as an exercise of ' ~j udicia1 powers" because it had the
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effect of setting aside the court's prior judgment. Rather,
the court concluded:
"It is unquestionable that the Constitution has invested
Congress with no judicial powers; it cannot be doubted
that a legislative direction to a court to find a judgment
in a certain way would be little less than a judgment
rendered directly by Congress. But here Congress do
not attempt to award judgment, nor to grant a new trial
judicwlly; neither have they reversed a decree of this
court; nor attempted in any way to interfere with the
administration of justice. Congress are here to all intents and purposes the defendants, and as such they
come into court through this resolution and say that they
will not plead the former trial in bar, nor interpose the
legal objection which defeated a recovery before." 2 Ct.
Cl., a.t 457-458 (emphasis in original).
The N ock court thus expressly rejected the applicability of
separation of powers objections to a congressional decision to
waive the res judicata effect of a judgment in the Government's favor. 24
24 The joint resolution at issue in Nock also limited the amount of the
judgment. that the Court. of Claims could award Nock to a sum that had
been established in a report of tl1e Solicitor of the Treasury to the Senate.
See 14 Stat. 608. The court rejected the Government's argument that
the Constitution had not vested in Congress "such discretion to fetter or
circumscribe the comse of justice." See 2 Ct. CI., at 455. The court
reasoned that this limitation on the amount, of the claimant's recovery
was a valid exercise of Congress, power to condition waivers of the sovereign immunity of the United States. "[I]t would be enough to say
that the defendants cannot be sued except with their own consent; and
Congress have the same power to give this consent to a second action as
they had to give it to a first ." Id., a.t 458.
Just because we have addrcs~ed our attention to the ancient Court of
Claims' deri~ion iu Nock, it ~hould not be inferred that legi:;lative artion
of the type at issue here is a remnant of the far-distant past. Specia1
juri:;dictional acts waiving affirmative defenses of the United States to
legal <rlaitns, and directing the Court of Claims to resolve the merits of

'
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The principles set forth in Cherokee Nation and Nock were
substantially reaffirmed by this Court in Pope v. United
States, 323 U. S. 1 (1944). There Congress had enacted
special legislation conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of
Claims, "notwithstanding any prior determination, any statthose claims, are legion. See Mizokami v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 736,
740-741, and nn. 1 and 2, 414 F. 2d 1375, 1377, and nn. 1 and 2 (1969)
(collecting cases). A list of cases, in addition to tho~:;e discussed in the
text, that have recognized or acted upon Congress' power to wa.ive the
defense of res judicata to claims against the United States follows (the
li~;t is not intended to be exhau~;tive): United States v. Grant, 110 U. S.
225 (1884); Lamborn t~ Co. v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 703, 724-728,
G5 F. Supp. 569, 576-578 (1946); Menominee Tribe v. United States,
101 Ct. Cl. 10, 19 (1944); Richardson v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 948,
956-957 (1935); Delaware Tribe v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 368 (1932);
Garrett v. United States, 70 Ct. Cl. 304, 310-312 ( 1930).
In Richardson, the Court of Claims observed:
"The power of Congress by special act to waive any defense, either legal
or equitable, which the Government may have to a suit in this court, as
it did in the Nock and Cherokee Nation cases, has never been questioned.
The reports of the court are replete with ca:;es where Congress, impressed
with the equitable justice of claims which have been rejected by the court
on legal grounds, has, any special act, waived defenses of the Government
which prevented recovery and conferred jurisdiction on the court to again
adjudicate the case. In such instances the court proceeded in conformity
with the provisions of the act of reference and in cases, too numerous for
citation here, awarded judgment:; to claimants whose claims had previously been rejected." 81 Ct. Cl., at 957.
Two similar decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. are of int·erest.. Both involved t11e constitutionality of a
joint resolution that set aside dismissals of actions brought under the
World War Ve1erans' Act, 1924, 38 U. S. C. § 445 (1952 ed.), and authorized the reim;tatement of those war risk Insurance disability claims.
The Court of Appeals found no constitutional prohibition against a congre:;,;ional waiver of an adjudication in the Government's favor, or against
conferring upon claimants against the United States the right to have
their cal:le:; heard again on the merits. See James v. United States, 8'i
F . 2d 897, 898 (CA8 1937); United States v. Hossmann, 84 F. 2d 808,
810 (CA8 1936). The court relied, in part, on the holding in Cheroke~;
Nation, and the sovereign immunity rationale applied in Noek.
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ute of limitations, release, or prior acceptance of partial
allowance, to hear, determine, and render judgment upon 1'
certain claims against the United States arising out of a construction contract. Special Act of February 27, 1942, § 1, 56
Stat. 1122. The court was a1so directed to determine Pope's
claims and render judgment upon them according to a part icular formula for measuring the value of the work that he
hacl performed. The Court of Claims construed the Special
Act as deciding the questions of law presented by the case,
and leaving it the role merely of computing the amount of
the judgment for the claimant according to a mathematical
formula. Pope v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. ·375, 379~380, 53
F . Supp. 570, 571-572 (1944). Based upon that reading of
the Act, and this Court's decision in United States v. Klein,
13 Wall. 128 (1872) (see discussion 'infra, at - ), the Court
of Claims held that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with
judicial independence. 100 Ct. Cl., at 380-382, 53 F. Supp.,
at 572- 573. It distinguisbed Cherokee Nation as a case ·in
which Congress granted a claimant a new trial, without directing the courts how to decide the case. I d., at 387, and
n. 5, 53 F. Supp., at 575, and n. 5.
This Court reversed the Court of Claims' judgment. In
doing so, the Court difi'ered with the Court of Claims' interpretation of the efi'ect of the Special Act. First, the Court
held that the Act did not disturb the earlier judgment denying Pope's claim for damages. "While inartistically drawn
the Act's purpose and effect seem rather to have been to
create a new obligation of the Government to pay petitioner's
claims where no obligation existed before." 323 U. S., at 9.
Second, the Court held that Congress' recognition of Pope's
claim was within its power to pay the Nation's debts, and
that its use of the Court of Claims as an instrument for exercising that power did not impermissibly invade the judicial
fun ction :
""\Ve perceive no constitutional obstade to Congress'
imposing on the Governm.ent a new obligation where
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there had been none before, for work performed by petitioner which was beneficial to the Goverment and for
which Congress thought he had not been adequately
compensated. The power of Congress to provide for the
payment of debts, conferred by § 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, is not restricted to payment of those obligations which are legally binding on the Government.
It extends to the creation of such obligations in recognition of claims which are merely moral or honorary....
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427. . . . Congress,
by the creation of a legal, in recognition of a moral, obligation to pay petitioner's claims plainly did not encroach
upon the judicial function which the Court of Claims had
previously exercised in adjudicating that the obligation
was not legal. [Footnote citing N ock and other cases
omitted.l Nor do we think it did so by directing that
court to pass upon petitioner's claims in conformity to
the particular rule of liability prescribed by the Special
Act and to give judgment accordingly ... see Cherokee
Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 486." 323 U. S.,
at 9-10.
In explaining its holding that the Special Act d:d not invade the judicial province of the Court of Claims by directing it to reach its judgment with reference to a specified
formula, the Court stressed that Pope was required to pursue
his claim in the usual manner, that the earlier factual findings
made by the Court of Claims were not necessarily rendered
conclusive by the Act, and that, even if Congress had stipulated to the facts, it was still a judicial function for the Court
of Claims to render judgment on consent. Id., at 10-12.
To be sure, the Court in Pope specifically declined to consider "just what application the principles announced in the
Klein case could rightly be given to a case in which Con~ress
sought, pendente lite, to set aside the judgment of the Court
of Claims in favor of the Government and to require reliti~
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gation of the suit." !d., a.t 8-9. The case before us might
be viewed as presenting that question. We conclude, however, that the separation of powers question presented in this
case has already been answered in Cherokee Nation, and that
that answer is completely consistent with the principles articulated in Klein.
The decisio · United States v. Klein 13 Wall. 128 (1872),
arose from tl following facts:
was the administrator
e deceased owner of property
of the estate of
that had been sold by agents of the Government during the
War Between the States. Klein sued the United States in
the Court of Claims for the proceeds of that sale. His lawsuit was based on the Abandoned and Captured Property Act
of March 12, 1863, 12 Stat. 820, which afforded such a cause
of action to noncombatant property owners upon proof that
they had "never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion." Following the enactment of this legislation, President Lincoln has issued a proclamation granting "a full
pardon" to certain persons engaged "in the existing rebellion"
who desired to resume their allegiance to the Government,
upon the condition that they take and maintain a prescribed
oath. This pardon was to have the effect of restoring those
persons' property rights. See 13 Stat. 737. · The Court of
Claims held that" Wilson's taking of the amnesty oath had
cured his participation in "the ... rebellion," and that his
administrator, Klein, was thus entitled to the proceeds of the
sale. Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1869).
The Court of Claims' decision in Klein's case was consistent
with this Court's later decision in a similar case, United States
v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531 (1870), holding that the presidential
pardon pqrged a participant "of whatever offence against the
laws of the United States he had committed ... and relieved
[him 1 from any penalty which he might have incurred."
ld., at 543. Following the Court's announcement of the
judgment in Padelfdrd, however, Congress enacted a prqviso
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to the appropriations bill for the Court of Claims. The proviso had three effects: First, no presidential pardon or amnesty was to be admiss ble in evidence on behalf of a claimant in the Court of Claims as the proof of loyalty required
by the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. Second, the
Supreme Court was to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, any
appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of
a claimant who had established his loyalty through a pardon.
Third, the Court of Claims henceforth was to treat a claimant's receipt of a presidential pardon, without protest, as
conclusive evidence that he had given aid and comfort to the
rebellion, and to dismiss any lawsuit on his behalf for want
of jurisdiction. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230,
235.
The Government's appeal from the judgment in Klein's
case was decided by this Court following the enactment of
the appropriations proviso. This Court held the proviso unconstitutional notwithstanding Congress' recognized power
"to make 'such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction'
[of the Supreme Court] as should seem to it expedient." 13
Wall., at 145. See U. S. Canst., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This
holding followed from the Court's interpretation of the proviso's effect:
"[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it
does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except
as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose
is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect
which this court had adjudged them to have." 13 Wall.,
at 145.
Thus, construed, the proviso was unconstitutional in two
respects: First, it prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner that required
the courts to decide a controversy in the Government's favor.
"The court is required to ascertain the existence of
certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdic-

·.
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tion on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What
is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause
in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of
Claims has rendered judgment for the claimant and an
appeal has been taken to this court. We are directed
to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment ~
be affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the interstate v
of the claimants. Can we do so without allowing one
party to the controversy to decide it in its own fav-or?
Can we do so without allowing that the legislature may
prescribe rules of decision to the J udicia.I Department of
the government in cases pending before it?

"

" . . . Can [Congress] prescribe a rule in conformity
with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction
thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in
accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This question
seems to us to answer itself." !d., at 146-147.
Second, the rule prescribed by the proviso "is also liable
to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, a,nd thus
infringing the constitutional power of the Executive." I d.,
at 147. The Court held that it would not serve as an instrument toward the legislative end of changing the effect of a
presidential pardon. ld., at 148.
It was, of course, the former constitutional objection held
applicable to the legislative proviso in K7ein that the Court
was concerned about in Pope. But that objection is not applicable to the case before us for two reasons. First, of
obvious importance to the Klein holding was the fact that
Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at issue
in the Government's own favor. Thus, Congress' action
could not be grounded upon its broad power to recognize and
pay the Nation's debts. Second, and even more important,
the proviso at issue in Klein had attempted "to prescribe a

f
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rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way [.]" 13
Wall., at 146. The amendment at issue in the present case,
however. ]ike the Special Act at issue in Cherokee Nation,
waived the defense of res judicata so that a legal claim could
be resolved on the merits. Congress made no effort in either
instance to control the Court of Claims' ultimate decision of
that claim. See n. 23, supra. 2"
25

Before completing our analysis of this Court's precedents in this
area, we turn to the question whether the holdings in Cherokee Nation,
Nock. and Pope, might have been bast>d on views, once held by this Court,
ihnt the Court of Clnims was not, in all re~Jll'ct:;, an Art. III court, and
that rlaimR again;;t the United State;; were not within Art. III's extension of "judicial Power" "to Controver~it>s to which the United States
shall be a Party." U. S. Com:t ., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
Pope it;;elf would ~eem to disp~·l any such conclusion. See 323 U. S.,
at 12-14. Moreover, Mr. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530
(1962), la~·s that que:;tion to rest. In Glidden, tht> plurality observed
that "it is probably true that Congress devotes a more lively attention
to the work performed by the Court of Claims, and that it has been more
prone to modify the jurisdiction assigned to that court." !d., at 566.
But they concluded that that circumstance did not render the decisions of
the Court of Claims legislative in character, nor, impliedly, did those
instances of "lively attention" constitute impermissible interference with
the Court of Claims' judicial functions.
"Throughout its history the Court of Claims has frequently been given
juri:-;diPtion by ~JWcial act to award recovery for breach of what would
have bern, on the part of an individual, a.t most a moral obligation . ...
Congi'ess has waived the benefit of res judicata, Cherokee Nation v.
United States, 270 U. S. 476, 486, and of defenses based on the passage
of time ...•
"In doing so, as this Court has uniformly held, Congress has enlisted
the aid of judicial power whose exercise is amenable to appellate review
here. . . . Indeed the Court has held that Congress may for reasons
adequate to itself confer bounti-es upon persons and, by consenting to suit,
convPrt their moral claim into a legal one enforceable by litigation in an
undoubted constitutional court. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S.
427.
"The issue was settled beyond peradventure in Pope v. United States,
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When Congress enacted the amendment directing the Court
of Claims to review the merits of the Black Hills claim, it
neither brought into question the finality of that court's
earlier judgments, nor interfered with that Court's judicial
function in deciding the merits of the claim. When the Sioux
returned to the Court of Claims following passage of the
amendment, they were there in pursuit of judicial enforcement of a new legal right. Congress had not "reversed" the
Court of Claims' holding that the claim was barred by res
judicata, nor, for that matter, had it reviewed the 1942 decision rejecting the Sioux' claim on the merits. As Congress
explicitly recognized, it only was providing a forum so that
a new judicial review of the Black Hills claim could take
place. This review was to be based on the facts found by
the Court of Claims after reviewing all the evidence, and an
application of generally controlling lega.J principles to those
facts. For these reasons, Congress was not reviewing the·
merits of the Court of Claims' decisions, and did not interfere
with the finality of its judgments.
323 U. S. 1. There the Court held that for Congress to direct the Court
of Claims to entertain a claim theretofore barred for any legal reason from
recovery-as, for instance, by the statute of limitations, or because the
contract had been drafted to rxclude such claims-was to invoke the use
of judicial power, notwitbstanding that the task might involve no more·
than computation of the sum due. . . . After this decision it cannot be
douuled that when Congress transmutes a moral obligation into a legal
one by specially consenting to suit, it authorizes the tribunal that hears
the case to perform a judicial function." 370 U. S., at 566-567 ( citations omitted).
The Court in Glidden held that, at least. since 1953, the Court of
Claims has been an Art. III court. See id .. at 585-589 (concurring
opinion). In his opinion concurring in the result, Mr. Just ice Clark did
not take iHsue with the plurality's view that suits against thr Unitrd States
are "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party," within·
the meaning of Art. III . Compare 370 U. S., at '562-565 (plurality opinion) witl1 'id., at 586-587 (concurring opinion).

t
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Moreover, Congress in no way attempted to prescribe the
outcome of the Court of Claims' new review of the merits.
That court was left completely free to reaffirm its 1942 judgment that the Black Hil1s claim was not cognizable under the
Fifth Amendment, if upon its review of the facts and law,
such a decision was warranted. In this respect, the amendment before us is a far cry from the legislatively enacted
"consent judgment" milled into question in Pope, yet found
constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress' broad power
to pay the Nation 's debts. And, for the same reasons, this
amendment clearly is distinguishable from the proviso to this
Court's appellate jurisdiction ·held unconstitutional in Klein.
In sum, as this Court implicitly held in Cherokee Nation,
Congress' mere waiver of the res judicata effect of a prior
judicial de~eject11i:g t1le vahaity of legal claim against
the United States does not violate the doctrine of separ,!ttion
of powers.

a

~

IV
A
In reaching its conclusion that the 1877 Act effected a taking of the Black Hills for which just compensation was due
the Sioux under the Fifth Amendment, the Court of Claims
relied upon the "good faith effort" test developed in its earlier
decision in 1'hree Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v.
United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 543, 390 F . 2d 686 (1968). The
Fort Berthold test had been designed to reconcile two lines
of cases decided by this Court that seemingly were in conflict. The first line, exemplified by Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U. S. 553 (1903), recognizes "that Congress possesse[sJ
a paramount power over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and
that such authority might be implied, even though opposed
to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians." I d., at 565.
The second line, exemplified by the more recent decision in
Shoshone :l'ribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476 (1937), con~

..
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cedes Congress' paramount power over Indian property, but
holds, nonetheless, that 11 [ t] he power does not extend so far
as to enable the Government 'to give the tribal lands to
others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without
rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation.'" Id., at 497 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation,
295 U. S. 103, 110 (1935) ). In Shoshone Tribe, Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in speaking for the Court, expressed the distinction
between the conflicting principles in a characteristically pithy
phrase: 11Spoliation is not management." 299 U. S., at 498.
The Fort Berthold test distinguishes between cases in which
one or the other principle is applicable:
''It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneonsly
(1) act as trustee ·for tht:> benefit of the Indians, exercising its plenary powers over the Indians aud their
lJroperty, as it thin"ks is in their best interests, and
(2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, taking the Indians' property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. In any given situation
in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian people, it must have acted either in one capacity or the
other. Congress can own two bats, but it cannot wear
them both at the same time.
11
Some guideline must be established so that a court
can identify in which capacity Congress is acting. The
followiug guideline would best give recognition to the
basic distinction between the two types of congressional
actio11: Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give
the Indians the full value of the land and thus merely
transmutes the property from land to money, there is no
taking. This is a mere substitution of assets or change
of form and is a traditional function of a trustee." 182.
Ct. Cl. , at 553, 390 F. 2d, at 691.
Applying the Fort Berthold test to the facts of this case,
the ·court of Claims concluded that, in passing the 1877 Act...
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Congress had not made a, good-faith effort to give the Sioux
the full value of the Black Hills. The rincipal issue presented by this case is whether the legal stan ar applied by
the Court of Claims was erroneous. 26

B
The Government contends that the Court of Claims erred
insofar as its holding that the 1877 Act effected a taking of
the Black Hills was based on Congress' failure to indicate
affirmatively that the co11sideration given the Sioux was of
equivalent value to the property rights ceded to the Government. It argues that "the true rule is that Congress must
be assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage
tribal assets if it reasonably can be conCluded that the legislation was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe~"
Brief for United States 52. The Government derives support for this rule principally from this Court's decision in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.
In Lone Wolf, representatives of the Kiowa, Comanche,
and Apache tribes brought an equitable action against the
Secretary of the Interior and other governmental officials to
enjoin them from enforcing the terms of an act of Congress
It should be recognized at the outset that the inquiry presented by
this case is different from that confronted in the more typical of our
recent " taking" decisions. E . g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, U. S.
(1979) ; Penn Central Transp . Co . v. N ew York, 438 U. S. 104 (1978) .
In those ca8es the Court has sought to " detcrmin[e] when 'justice ~
and fairness' require that, economic injuries caused by public action be
compensa.trd by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concrntrated on a few persons.'' Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124. Here,
there is no doub t that the Black Hills were "taken" from the Sioux in a
way that wholly dei)rivcd them of their property rights to that land. The
question prrRent ed is whrthcr Congre<:s was acting under circumstances in
whirh that " taking" implied an obligation to p ay just compensntion, or
whether it wns ac ting pursuant to its unique powers to mannge and COJh
trol triba l property us th e gunrdian of Indian welfare, in which event the
Just Compensation Clause would not apply.
20
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that called for the sale of lands held by the Indians pursuant
to the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, 15 Stat. 581. That
treaty, like the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, included a provision that any future cession of reservation lands would be
without validity or force "unless executed and signed by at
least three fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying
the same." !d., at 58~. The legislation at issue, Act of
June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 672, was based on an agreement with
the Indians that had not been signed by the requisite number
of adult males residing on the reservation.
This Court's principal holding in Lone Wolf was that "the
legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties
made with the Indians." 187 U. S., at 566. The Court
stated:
"The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an
Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be
exercised only when circumstances arise which will not
only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may ·demand, in the interest of
the country and the Indians themselves, that it should
do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was
never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy,
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards
the Indians." Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) 27
The Court. therefore, was not required to consider the contentions of the Indians that the agreement ceding their lands
This a ~pect of the Lon e Wolf holding, often rea ffirmed, see, e. g.,
Rosebud SiO'ux Trib e v. Kn eip, 430 U. S. 584, 594 (1977) , is not at issue
27

in this case . The Sioux do not claim that C0ngress was without power
to take the Bla ck Hills from them in contravention of t.he Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1868. They claim only that Congress could not do so inconsistently with the command of the Fifth Amendment: " nor shall private
property be taken for publi c use, without just compemsation.'1

'

I

79- 639-0PINION
th ITED 8TATES v. SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS

39

had been obtained by fraud, and had not been signed by the
requisite number of adult males. "[A]ll these matters, in
any event. were solely within the domain of the legislative
authority and its action is conclusive upon the courts." !d.,
at 568.
. \. ~he penultimate paragraph of the opinion, however, the
Court_]J-one Wolf went on to ma.ke some observations seem~
ingly directed to the question whether the act at issue might
constitute a ta.king of Indian property without just compen~
sation. The Court there stated:
"The act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of in
the bill, was enacted at a time when the tribal relations
between the confederated tribe~ of Kiowas, Comanches
and Apaches still existed, and that statute and the stat~
utes supplementary thereto dealt with the disposition of
tribal property and purported to give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not allotted among the
Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the controversy which this case presents is concluded by the
decision in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294,
decided at this term, where it was held that full administrative power was possessed by Congress over Indian
tribal property. In effect, the action of Congress now
complained of was but an exercise of such power, a mere
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those who, as we have held, were
in substantial effect the wards of the government. We
must presume that Congress acted i·n perfect good faith
in the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is
made, and that the legislative branch of the government
exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any
event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If
injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be under~

1"
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stood a implying, by the use made by Congress of
its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that
body for redress and uot to the courts. The legislation in question was constitutional." Ibid. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Government relics on the italicized sentence in the
quotation above to suport its view "that Congress must be
assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage
tribal assets if it reasonably can be concluded that the legislation was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe."
Several adjoining passages in the paragraph, however, lead
us to doubt whether the Lone Wolf Court meant to state a
general rule applicable to cases such as the one before us.
First, L(Yrle Wolf presented a situation in which Congress
"purported to give an adequate consideration" f~r .~
lands taken from the Indians. In fact, the ~ issue set
..._
aside for the Indians a sum certain of $2 million for surplus
reservation lands surrendereu to the United States. 31 Stat.
678; see 187 U. S., at 555. In contrast, the background of
the 1877 Act "reveals a situation where Congress did not
'purport' to provide 'adequate consideration,' nor was there
any meaningful negotiation or arm's-length bargaining, nor
did Congress consider it was paying a fair price." 220 Ct.
Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1176 (concurring opinion).
Second, given the provisions of the act at issue in Lone
Wolf, the Court reasonably was able to conclude that "the
action of Congress now complained of was but .... a mere
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property."
Under the Act of June 6, 1900, each head of a family was to
be allotted a tract of land within the reservation of not less
than 320 acres, an additional 480,000 acres of grazing land
were set aside for the use of the tribes in common, and $2
million was paid to the Indians for the remaining surplus.
31 Stat. 677- 678. In contrast, the historical background ta
the opBu'ing of .the Biack Hiils for settiement, and the t~rir);$:
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or th€' 1877 Act itself, see Part I, supra, would not lead one
to conclude that the Act effected "a mere change in the form
of .i11Vestment of Indian tribal property."
Third, it seems significant that the views of the Court in
Lone Wolf were based, in part, on a holding that "Congress
possessed full power in the matter." Earlier in the opinion
the Court stated: "Plenary authority over the tribal relations
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department
of the government." 187 U. S.. at 565. Thus, it seems that
the Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good
faith was based in large measure on the idea that relations
between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not amenable to judicial review. That view, of course,
has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). 28
28 For thi;; rea, on, the Government does not here press Lone Wolf to
its logical limits, arguing instead !hat its "strict rule" that the manageml'nt and disposal of tribal lands is a political question, "has been relaxed
in recent years to allow review under thr Fifth Amendment rationalbasis test ." Brief for United Statrs 55, n. 46. The Government relies
on Delaware 1'ribal Business Cornm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977),
and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 555 (1974), as establishing a,
rational-ba si ~-; ll'st for determining whether Congress, in a given instance,
confiscated Indian property or engaged merely in its power to manage
and rlisposf' of i ribal lands in the Indians' best interests. But those cases,
which l'Slablish a standard of review for judgiug the constitutionality of
Indian legislation under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
do not provide an api analogy for resolution of the issuE' presrnted herewhelhl'r Congress' disposition of tribal properly was an exNcisc of its
power of rminent domain or iis power of guardianship. As noted earlier,
supm, at n. 27, the Sioux concpdp the constitutionality of Congre~:;s' unilateral abrogation of the Fort LaramiP Treaty. They Hl'Pk only a holding
that ihe Black Hill::; " werP appropriated by thl' United StateF< in circumRtrmces which involvPd an implied undertakmg by it to make just comllCP.:Sation to the lribc." United States. v. Creek Nation, 295 U. 8 ', 1:03',
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to the objective facts as revealed by Acts of Congre~s,
congressional committee reports, statements submitted to
Congress by government officials, reports of special commissions appointed by Congress to treat with the Indians,
and similar evidence relating to the acquisition ....
"The 'good faith effort' and 'transmutatio11 of property' concepts referred to in Fort Berthold are opposite
sides of the same coi11. They reflect the traditional rule
that a trustee may change the form of trust assets as
long as he fairly (or in good faith) attempts to provide
his ward with property of equivalent value. If he does
that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should demonstrate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other hanrl.
if a trustee (or the government in its dealings with the
Indians) does not attempt to give the ward the fair
equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to
that extent has taken rather than transmuted the property of the ward. In other words, an essential clement
of the inquiry under the Fort Berthold guideline is deter..
mining the adequacy of the consideration the government gave for the Indian lands it acquired. That inquiry cannot be avoided by the government's simple
assertion that it acted in good faith in its dealings with
the Indians." 220 Ct. Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1162. 30
An examination of this ~tandard reveals that, contrary to the Government'::; as::;ertion, the Court of Claims in thi::; case did not ba::;e its finding
of u taking solely ou Cougre::;o1 fai]ure in 1877 to ::;tate affirmatively that
the ''a::;set::;" givrn the Sioux in exchange for fhe Black Hills were equivaleut in valuP to the land surrendered. Rafher, the court left open the
pos..~ibility that, in an approJ>riate case, a mPrP as::mtion of congressional
good faith in ·etting the terms of a forced surrender of treaty-protected
land::; could be overcome by objective indicia to the contrary. And, in
like 'fa::;hion, there may be instance::; in which the consideration provided
the Indian~ for surrendered treaty lands wa;; so patently adequate and fair
that Congres;;' failure to state the obvious would not result in the finding
of a. compen::;able taking.
To the extent thtLt lhe Coqrt of Claim;;' l:ltandard, in this respect 1
30

.,

79-639-0PINION
t'~ITED

STATES

v. SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS

45

D
We next examine the factual findings made by the Court
of Claims, which led it to the conclusion that the 1877 Act
effected a taking. First, the Court found that "[tjhe only
item of 'consideration' that possibly could be viewed as showing an attempt by Congress to give the Sioux the 'full value'
of the land the government took from them was the requirement to furnish them with rations until they became selfsufficient." 220 Ct. Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1166. This
finding is fully supported by the record, and the Government
does not seriously contend otherwise. 31
departed from the original formulation of the Fott Berthold test, see 220
Ct. Cl., at - , 601 F. 2d, at 1182-1183 (dissenting opinion), such a
departure was wurnmtei.l. The Court of Claims' pre8ent formulation of
the te><t , which takes into account tlw adequacy of the consideration given,
does little more than reaffirm the ancient principle that the determination
of the mea:sure of just compensation for a taking of private property "is
a judirial and not a legislative question." Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States. 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
31 The 1877 Act, see supra, at - , and n. 14, JlUrported to provide the
Sioux with "all necel:lsary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of
civilization ," and "to furnish to them schools and instruction in mt>chanieal and agrinultural arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868." 19 Stat.
256. The Court of Claims correctly concluded that the fir:st item " was so
vague that it cannot be cons;dered us constituting a meaningful or significant elrment. of paymPnt by thr United States." 220 Ct. Cl., at - , 601
F. 2d, ut 1166. As for the :second, it "ga,ve the Sioux nothing to which
tht>Y were not already entitled [undrr the 1868 treHtyJ." /d., Ht - , 601
F. 2d, at 1166.
The Government has placed ::>orne reliance in this Court on the fact thHt
the 1877 Act ext(•nded the northern boundHries of the re:servation bv addirg some 900,000 acre::> of grazing land::>. See n. 14, supra. In the Court
of C 1aim:s, howrver, the Governmrnt did "not contend ... that the tranofer
of thi:s additional land was a significant p)emen1 of the con::>ideration the
Unitrd Statr::> gave for the Black Hills." 220 Ct. Cl., a t - , n. 3, 601 F.
2d, at 1163. n . 3. And Congre:s::> obviously did uot intend the exteno;ion of
thr re::>ervation '~ northern bordnr to constitute con:siderHtion for the proper!~· right:,; surrendpred by thE' Sioux. The extpn:;icn wa:s effected in thHt
!lrtlrle of the Act redefining the re:;ervation':s bord<>r::> ; it wns not men·
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SecoiHl, the court found, after engaging in an exhaustive
review of the historical record, that neither the Mauypenny
Cornmissiou, nor the cougressional committees that approved
the 1877 Act, nor the individual legislators who spoke on its
behalf ou the floor of Congress, ever indicated a belief that
the Government's obligation to provide the Sioux with rations
constituted a fair equivalent for the value of the Black Hills
and the additional property rights the Indians were forced to
surrender. See id., at - - - , 601 F. 2d, at 1166-1168.
This finding is unchallenged by the Government.
1\. third fiuding lending some weight to the Court's legal
couclusion was that the conditions placed by the Government on the Sioux' entitlement to rations, see n. 14, supra,
"further show that the government's undertaking to furnish
rations to the Indians uutil they could support themselves did
not reflect a congressional decision that the value of the
rations was the equivaleut of the land the Indians were giving
up , but instead was an attempt to coerce the Sioux into
capitulating to congressional demands." !d., at - , 601 F.
2d, at 1168. We might add only that this finding is fully
eonsistent with similar observations made by this Court
nearly a century ago in an analogous case.
In Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 35 (1886),
tioned in the article which stated 1ht> consideration given for the Sioux'
" ct>R.Sion of !t>rritory and right:-;." Sec 19 Stat. 255-256. l\Ioreover, our
characterizing thP 900,000 acres a.s a::;:-;ets givt>n the Sioux in con:sidt>ration
for tlw propt>rty right~ they cc•dpu would not lead u::; to conclude that the
term:, of the CX('hange were "so palt>ntly adequate and fair" that a comJll'n::;abh' taking ::;hould not hnw been found . St>e n. 30, S'Upra.
Final!~ · , wP noll:' that tht> Government does not claim that tht> Indian
Claim:; Commi,::;ion and thr Court of Claim:; incorrectly valurd the prope r!~· right~ takPn by thr 1877 Act by failing to consider the exten~ion of
thr nort hPrn bordPr. Rather, the Govrrmnrnt argues only that the 900,000
acrt'~ ::;hould be con:sidrrt>d, along with tlw obligation to provide rations,
in <lPtrrminiug whellwr the Act, vi('Wf'd in its Pntirrty, con::;titutt'd a goodfaith effort on the part of Congrt>HS to prornotP the Sioux' welfare. See
BriPf ror United State::; 7:3, amlu. 5 .
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the Court held, over objections by the Government, that an
award made by the Senate on an Indian tribe's treaty claim
"was fair, just. and equitable." The treaty at issue had
called for the removal of the Choctaw Nation from treatyprotected lands in exchange for payments for the tribe's subsistence for one year. payments for cattle and improvements
on the new reservation, an annuity of $20,000 for 20 years
commencing upon removal, and the provision of educational
and agricultural services. I d., at 38. TI!is Court stated:
"It is notorious as a historical fact, as it abundantly
appears from the record in this case, that great pressure
had to be brought to bear upon the Indians to eft'ect
their removal, and the whole treaty was evidently and
purposely executed, not so much to secure to the Indians
the rights for which they had stipulated, as to eft'ectuate
the policy of the United States in regard to their removal.
The most noticeable thing, upon a careful consideration
of the terms of this treaty, is, that no money consideration is promised or paid for a cession of lands, the beneficial ownership of which is assumed to reside in the
Choctaw Nation, and computed to amount to over ten
millions of acres." I d., at 37-38.
As for the payments that had been made to the Indians in
order to induce them to remove themselves from their treaty
lands, the Court, in words we find applicable to the 1877 Act,
concluded:
"It is nowhere expressed in the treaty that these payments are to be made as the price of the lands ceded;
and they are all only such expenditures as the government of the United States could well afford to incur for
the mere purpose of executing its policy in reference to
the removal of the Indians to their new homes. As a
consideration for the value of the lo:nds ceded by the
treaty, they rnust be regarded as a rneagre pittance:')
!d., at 38 (emphasis supplied).

'
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These couclusions. in light of the historical backgTound to
th e opening of the Black Hills for settlement, see Part I,
S'Upra, seem fully applicable to Congress' decision to remove
the Sioux from that valuable tract of land, aud to extinguish
their off-reservation hunting rights.
Finally, the Court of Claims rejected the Government's
conteution that the fact that it subsequently haJ spent at
least $43 million on rations for the Sioux (over the course of
three quarters of a century) established that the 1877 Act
was au act of guardianship taken in the Sioux' best interest.
The court concluded : "The critical inquiry is what CongTess
did- and how it viewed the obligation it was assuming-at
th e time it acquired the land, and not how much it ultimately
cost the ·united States to fulfill the obligation." 220 Ct. Cl.,
at - . 601 F. 2d, at 1168. It found no basis for believing
that Congress, in 1877, anticipated that it would take the
Rioux such a lengthy period of time to become self-sufficient,
or that the fulfillment of the Government's obligation to feed
the Sioux would entail the large expenditures ultimately
made on their behalf. Ibid. We find no basis on which to
question the legal standard applied by the Court of Claims,
or the findiugs it reached, conceming Congress' decision to
provide the Sioux with rations.

E
The aforemeu tioned findings fully support the Court of
Claims' couclusion that the 1877 Act appropriated the Black
Hills "in circumstances which involved an implied undertaking by [the United Statesl to make just compensation to
the tribe. " United States v. Creek N ation, 295 U. S., at 111.
We make only two additional observations about this case.
First, dating at lea st from the decision in Cherok ee Nation v.
Kansas Railway Co. , 135 U.S. 641 , 657 (1890), this Court has
recognized that Indian lands, to which a tribe holds recognized title, "are held subject .to th e authority of the general
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government to lake them for such objects as are germane to
the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that
they are not taken without just compensation being made to
the owner." In the same decision the Court emphasized that
the owner of such lands 11 is en titled to reasonable, certain and
adequate provision for obtainiug compensation before his occupancy is disturbed." Id. , at 659. The Court of Claims
gave effect to this principle when it held that the Government's uncertain and indefinite obligation to provide the
Sioux with rations until they become self-sufficient did not
constitute adequate consideration for the Black Hills.
Second, it seems readily apparent to us that the obligation
to provide rations to the Sioux was undertaken in order to
ensure them a means of surviving their transition from the
uomadic life of the hunt to the agrarian lifestyle Congress
had chosen for them. Those who have studied the Government's reservatiou policy during this period of our Nation's
history agree. See n. 11 , supra. It is important to recognize
that the 1877 Act, in additiou to removing the Black Hills
from the Great Sioux Reservation , also ceded the Sioux'
huntiug rights in a vast tract of land extending beyoud the
boundaries of that reservatiou. See 11. 14, supra. Under
such circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress'
undertaking of an obligation to provide rations for the Sioux
was a quid pro quo for deprivin them of their chosen way
of lfe, an was not mtended to compensate t em for the
taking of the Black Hills. 3 ~
We find furthPr support for fbi~ c onclu::~ion in Congre::;s' 1974 amendment to § 2 of thf' Indian C laim ~< Commission Act, 25 U. S. C. § 70a.
SPP n. 17, supra. That armndment provided that in det ermining offsets,
"expenditures for food, rations , or provisions shall not be deemed payments
on f hr claim ." Th r rrport- of thf' Senate CommittrP on Interior and
Insula r Affa irs, whi<"h accompanied thio; ammdment , made two points that
aro pprf inPut. here. First, it notPd tha t " [a J!though rouchPd in general
1Prms, this amPndment is dirrrt ed to one basic objec tive-expediting the
Indian Cla ims Commi ~~ ion 'i:i di,position of the fa m o u,.~ Black Hill ~ Calle ....
3"
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In sum, we conclude that the legal analysis and factual
findings of the Court of Claims fully support its conclusion
that the terms of the 1877 Act did not effect "a mere change
in the form of investment of Indian tribal property." Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S., at 568. Rather, the 1877 Act
effected a taking of tribal property, property which had been
set aside for the exclusive occupation of the Sioux by the Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1868. That taking implied an obligation
on the part of the Government to make just compensation to
the Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of
·interest, must now, at last, be paid.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

It i$ so

ordered.

·.

S. Rep. No. 9:3-863, p. 2 (1974) (incorporating memorandum prepared
by the Sioux Tribe;;) . Second, the Committee obsrrved:
" The farts are, as the Commis::;ion found, that the United States disarmed the Sioux and denird them their traditional hunting areas in an
effort to forcr the ::;ale of the Black Hill:>. Having violated the 1868 Treaty
and having reduced the Indians to starvation, thr United States should
not now bP in the po~:>ition of saying that the rations it furni::;hed constituted payment for the land which it took. In short, the Government committed two wrongs : first, it deprived the Sioux of tht>ir livt>lihood; secondly,
it dt>privt>d thp Sioux of their land . What the United States gave back in
ratio'ns :;hould not be l:ltretched to cover both wrongs." /d ., at 4-5.
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CHAMBERS OF
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June 16, 1980

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

.

2!lgt~~

...

79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians

Dear Harry,
Regretfully, for the reasons I shall state, I am reluctant to join all of your opinion. In the first place, I have
found the case a much closer one on the merits than your
opinion makes it out to be. Also, the validity of the Indian
Claims Commission finding that the government acted unfairly
and dishonorably is not before us, and I do not entirely
share the atmosphere of your draft that mten casts the conduct of the government in such an unfavorable light. I would
also prefer in stating the historical facts to stand on the
record rather than to rely on accounts by historians and
other writers whose accuracy and objectivity have not been
put to the test.
I agree with your Part III and with the general conclusion
stated in: Part V that when judged by currently prevailing Fifth
Amendment standards, the Court of Claims was correct in concluding that the government actions at issue here effected a taking
for which compensation was and is due.
I shall file a statement to this effect.
Sincerely yours,

Av~
Mr. Justice Blackmun
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Copies to the Conference
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Sioux Nation

Dear Harry:

lfp/ss
cc:

DOS

BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

June 20, 1980

RE:

No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation

Mr.

Just ice

Rehnquist' s

opinion

strikes

several

appeal inq

notes, but I believe in the end it is unpersuasive.

The araument on

the merits seems to me plainly to favor the Indians.

The Article III

question, however, is closer.
the full

Justice Rehnauist does not acknowledge

force of the opinion in Cherokee Nation v. United · states,

which held:
"The question of interest [on a prior award] was
considered and decided, and it is quite clear that but for
the special Act of 1919, above quoted, the ouest ion here
mooted would have been foreclosed as res iudicata.
In
pass ina the Act, Congress must have been well advised of
this, and the only possible construction therefore to be put
upon it is that Conaress has therein expressed its desire,
so far as the question of interest is concerned, to waive
the effect of the judgment as res · judicata. •
• The power
of Congress to waive such an adjudication is clear."
270
u.s., at 486.
I believe that this passage squarely controls the issue in this case,
unless

you

attempted

are

of

a

distinction

mind
of

to

the

repudiate

it.

precedent,

pp.

Justice
9-10,

Rehnquist's

seems

somewhat

lame.
As we discussed, the historical garment-rending indulqed in

1

I

2.
by the Court opinion is not necessary to the case.

Justice Rehnquist

forecefully makes this point in his final section.

Rather than join

Justice
course

Rehnquist's
might

substantive

be

to

holdings

equally
join
in

subjective

with

Justice

the

case

retort
White

(Parts

on
in

III

this,
joining
and

v),

the

best

only

the

and

by

implication reject the historical passaoes.
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CHAMBERS 01'"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 23, 1980

RE:

79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation
of Indians

Dear Harry:
I

join.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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